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My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Discuss right to travel in the world and Public highway.

Re: My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Postby country_hick » Thu Mar 09, 2017 7:21 pm

wealllbe20 wrote:You are a damn good researcher for having a "learning disability" :beerbang:

Thank you. I have an IQ over 120 but comprehension is much lower. I can learn things. However, poor presentment of ideas, facts, and statements and some types of language and sentence construction confuses and frustrates me to no end. I am a 2E. (look it up)
http://www.dogpile.com/search/web?fcoid=417&fcop=topnav&fpid=27&q=2e&ql= (look for web results past the ads)

Researching is easy. Think, ask, read, then apply results.
Figuring out legalese and Court rules is almost impossible. It is designed to confuse.

What no amount of research can provide is an understanding of how judges can make determinations against what was obviously not proven.
Last edited by country_hick on Fri Mar 31, 2017 8:52 pm, edited 1 time in total.
There is a reason that LEO has a new meaning: Legally Entitled to Oppress. Thanks to Bob Livingston for this one.

Williams v. United States, 341 US 97 - Supreme Court 1951
It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court.

Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 US 54 - Supreme Court 1795
Judges may die, and courts be at an end; but justice still lives, and, though she may sleep for a while, will eventually awake, and must be satisfied
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Re: My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Postby country_hick » Fri Mar 31, 2017 4:57 pm

This is a work in progress. Maxims of law are in bold. I expect this document to get much longer.

I have yet to explain why the legislature made the law this way including the 9th amendment that kept our common law right intact (case law to be cited) to travel in any reasonable way on a road. (end online introduction to the document)

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

What is a man to do when the law is at odds with itself? The law literally read demands that a man act like a criminal to appear innocent. Imagine discovering you would be treated like a criminal if you actually follow the law as it is written. The law does not allow registration but does not recognize legal lack of registration. I do not have an automobile as legally defined. What a conundrum!

Let justice be done though the heavens fall.

The burden of the proof rests on the person who affirms, not the one who denies.

State v. Sklar, 317 A. 2d 160 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1974; This Court has long recognized that "governmental fair play" is the essence of "due process."

An error in law injures.

I require judicial notice and judicial cognizance be taken of all primary and secondary sources of law as well as maxims of law presented within this document.

Black's Law Dictionary 984 (4th ed. 1968). JUDICIAL COGNIZANCE. Judicial notice, or knowledge upon which a judge is bound to act without having it proved in evidence.


Reading Title 29-A a few times does not provide a true understanding of that title.

The laws consist not in reading but in understanding.

The presumption is always in favor of the one who denies.

I deny it is possible or required to register my machines under current Maine law. I deny Title 29-A applies to me.

No one is bound to do what is impossible.

An argument deduced from an impossibility has the greatest validity in law


29-A M.R.S.A. §351 (6). Improper registration either prevents me from obtaining a registration because the vehicle type (automobile) that my Grand Marquis was legally determined to be by the deputy and would (if applicable) require a registration does not apply as no trailer was in combination with my grand marquis. The only registration types that I might be able to use for registration purposes include automobile and combination vehicle. The state does not have any vehicle type defined in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 also existing in chapter 5 that is applicable to my grand marquis. I deny the state requires that my grand marquis, dodge ram, what I tow, or a horse and buggy require registration under 29-A M.R.S.A..

If you do not know the names of things, the knowledge of things themselves perishes.

If you do not know the names of things, the knowledge of things themselves perishes; and, if you lose the names, the distinction of the things is certainly lost.


When no specific requirement exists in law to require registration that non-existent law is incapable of violation. An erroneous understanding of law by law enforcement is irrelevant. Elements required by a law are relevant. No law exists that both allows and requires my Grand Marquis to be registered. Ignorance of the law is no excuse. Claiming a civil violation based on a law that has no relevance to the required legal elements is without excuse.

When public servants such as the director of vehicle services and the secretary of state refuse to properly apply the law as written that places others like myself in legal jeopardy I was put in a position where I had to either violate the law to appear to be within the law or to follow the law while appearing to violate the law which unfortunately invited unwanted law enforcement attention and interaction.

The truth of the description removes the error of the name.

Although I feel the idea of displaying a registration horizontally meaning flat is stupid my feelings about the law are irrelevant. I am not at liberty to ignore or violate a law just because I do not like or respect it. I displayed my registration plates as horizontally as possible based on my respect for the letter of the law after that knowledge was imparted to me as a shocking; but mandatory, legal requirement by 29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1).

Words are interpreted more strongly against the party who puts them forward; words are most readily accepted against the one putting them forward.

29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1) Position of registration plate. A registration plate must be displayed horizontally.

Random House unabridged dictionary 2nd edition 1993 page 921 (found at the law library)
horizontal adj. 1. at right angles to the vertical; parallel to level ground 2. flat or level

https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dicti ... horizontal 3-28-2017 Collins English Dictionary
Horizontal Something that is horizontal is flat and level with the ground, rather than at an angle to it.

I am shocked at how few people actually display their registration plates in accordance with this statute. Almost everyone in Maine uses an improper vertical display by placing registration plates in an upright vertical position on bumpers. I displayed registration plates horizontally on the dash and package tray. The flat method of display I used was as horizontal as possible based on my deepest solicitude and respect for the requirement existing in Maine statute.

After the legislature apparently decided that registration plates must be easily viewed by aircraft and red light cameras placed up high on poles for enforcement purposes they informed the people of Maine of that choice in 29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1).
I deny that horizontal excludes a flat display on a dash or package tray. I deny that registration plate view was required for anything but aircraft and elevated positions per statute. I deny that a horizontal position of registration plates is sensible. I deny I violated statute. A guilty claim by this court for 29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1) will show a federal court that unusable statutes did not provide clear and effective communications accommodating my ADA recognized learning disabilities as required by 28 CFR §35.

Ignorance of fact is excused but not ignorance of law.

A wrong is not presumed.

That interpretation is to be received that is free from fault.

When the words and the mind agree, there is no room for interpretation.

A custom, even if it is of great authority, is never prejudicial to plain truth.


I was placed in the untenable position of violating 29-A M.R.S.A. §351 (6). Improper registration by claiming or allowing to be claimed for me the Maine legislature defined “automobile” for the vehicle type on a registration. The only available registration types included automobile & combination vehicle. 29-A M.R.S.A. §501 (1) and §101 (7), (15-A), (86), (88), and (90) read together provide the legal definitions that must be met to have an automobile. The required legal definitions can not apply unless a trailer hitch is installed with a trailer attached. No trailer can be in combination without a trailer hitch and ball. I deny my grand marquis has an installed trailer hitch.

29-A M.R.S.A. §351 (6) Improper registration. For purposes of this subsection, "not properly registered" means the vehicle is either registered in a manner that is not reflective of its current actual use or as a type of vehicle that it is not as a matter of law, including, but not limited to, a motor vehicle registered as an antique auto when the vehicle is not an antique auto as defined in section 101, subsection 3.
In law every definition is dangerous.

29-A M.R.S.A. §501 (1) . Automobiles; pickup trucks. The fee for an automobile, a pickup truck registered for 6,000 pounds or less or a sport utility vehicle used for the conveyance of passengers or interchangeably for passengers or property is $35.
An automobile... used for the conveyance of passengers or property is a "combination" vehicle.

Words referred to are considered as if incorporated.

29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (15-A) Combination vehicle. "Combination vehicle" means a motor vehicle consisting of a truck or truck tractor in combination with one or more trailers or semitrailers.

Words are to be so understood that the matter may have effect rather than fail.

The only use requirements that mandate registration also change an automobile into a combination vehicle. When I do not have a trailer being drawn by my grand marquis it is not an automobile as defined in law. My grand marquis does not have a trailer hitch installed and was not in combination with 1 or more trailers or semitrailers. If the above statutes are not telling me what is plainly written as part of a legal vehicle definition then federal A.D.A. law has been violated.

The meaning of words is the spirit of the law.

Whenever there is no ambiguity in the words, then no exposition contrary to the words is to be made.


If my machine is designed for guests with the necessary implication of offering hospitality instead of for passengers with the necessary implication of paying a fare it is not an automobile. Without a trailer attached I do not have a combination vehicle. If my machine is not designed to carry property it is not a combination vehicle. If I do not use my machine primarily or over 50% of the time to carry property it is not a combination vehicle. If my machine is not used exclusively 100% of the time to draw other vehicles and is also not constructed to carry a load I do not have a combination vehicle. If it does not meet all the requirements shown above I do not have a combination vehicle per statutory definitions. If my Grand Marquis is not a combination vehicle it can not by statutory definitions be considered an automobile. The charge declares my Grand Marquis to be an automobile. If not the charge is without foundation.

Wilson v. Workman, 192 F. Supp. 852 - Dist. Court, D. Delaware 1961; In addition, to interpret the statute so as to bring the defendant within its reach violates the ordinary usage of "guest". This term as customarily understood connotes a relationship between persons in which one, the guest, receives some measure of hospitality from another, the host.

Riggs v. Roberts, 264 P. 2d 698 - Idaho: Supreme Court 1953
The courts have quite uniformly held that merely paying for gas and oil or sharing the payment for gas and oil is not of itself and alone sufficient to establish passenger status. Elliott v. Behner, 146 Kan. 827, 73 P.2d 1116; Whitechat v. Guyette, 19 Cal.2d 428, 122 P.2d 47.
The authorities likewise are quite uniform to the effect that to constitute one a passenger, not a guest, while the consideration need not be payment of money, there must be contributed by the passenger to the driver of the car something substantial and of worth to the driver, i. e., commercial, not mere courtesy. Albrecht v. Safeway Stores, 159 Or. 331, 80 P.2d 62. This payment or consideration may be made by the passenger or someone else. In other words, the driver must be actuated by a benefit of substantial value, not mere courtesy or kindness or recognition of the amenities or friendship, regardless of whether the one riding in the car or someone else pays or contributes this consideration, to make the rider a passenger. Melcher v. Adams, 174 Or. 75, 146 P.2d 354; Fuller v. Tucker, 4 Wash.2d 426, 103 P.2d 1086; Eubanks v. Kielsmeier, 171 Wash. 484, 18 P.2d 48; Elliott v. Behner, 146 Kan. 827, 73 P.2d 1116, supra; Ausich v. Frank, 70 Idaho 494, 222 P.2d 1073, supra.
Furthermore, the authorities indicate there must be a mutual understanding, reasonably clear to both the rider and the driver before the trip is undertaken, that the rider's relationship to the driver is that of a passenger and not a mere guest. Sprenger v. Braker, 71 Ohio App. 349, 49 N.E.2d 958.

Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 US 106 - Supreme Court 1949
Rights usual to passengers may be denied to the nonpaying guest in an automobile to limit vexatious litigation.

CASEY EX REL. CASEY v. Cuff, 133 A. 2d 659 - NJ: Appellate Div. 1957
"An automobile guest is a person who rides in the automobile of another, without conferring any benefit on him other than the pleasure of his company."
In Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.), there is this definition of the word guest:
"A person entertained in one's house or at one's table; a visitor entertained without pay; hence a person to whom the hospitality of a home, club, etc. is extended."
And in Funk and Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary, we find the following primary definition of guest:
"A person received and entertained at the house of another; a visitor; as a welcome guest. The term is applied with little respect to the duration of the call or visit and whether the person be present by invitation or not * * *."


The Casey v Cuff case above has explained very clearly that passengers and guests in or out of automobiles are not the same. A passenger pays for the privilege while a guest does not. A guest has hospitality extended without charge while a passenger must pay. I deny I charge for the use of my grand marquis. I deny its use or design is for passengers.

An argument based on a subdivision of the subject is most powerful in law.

As I deny my Grand Marquis was designed for passengers the plaintiff must prove that claim. See exhibit Ford. Ford explains that as my grand marquis if not certified for livery purposes is not designed for passengers. It therefore according to Ford Motor Company can not legally be considered to be an automobile under Maine law.

The truth of the description removes the error of the name.

When the words and the mind agree, there is no room for interpretation.


Black's Law Dictionary (9th & 10th ed. ).Passenger: No definition provided.

Things that have had a fixed interpretation are to be altered as little as possible.

Black's Law Dictionary 1280 (4th ed. 1968). PASSENGER. A person whom a common carrier has contracted to carry from one place to another, and has, in the course of the performance of that contract, received under his care either upon the means of conveyance, or at the point of departure of that means of conveyance. Bricker v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 132 Pa. 1, 18 A. 983, 19 Am.St. Rep. 585; Schepers v. Union Depot R. Co., 126 Mo. 665, 29 S.W. 712; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Price, 96 Pa. 256; The Main v. Williams, 14 S.Ct. 486, 152 U.S. 122, 38 L.Ed. 381; Horne v. Southern Ry. Co., 186 S.C. 525, 197 S.E. 31, 35, 116 A.L.R. 745.

PASSENGER One carried for hire, or reward, as distinguished from a "guest" who is one carried gratuitously, that is, without any financial return except such slight benefit as is customary as part of the ordinary courtesy of the road. Duncan v. Hutchinson, 139 Ohio St. 185, 39 N.E.2d 140, 142h
Words ought not to be accepted to import a false description when they are consistent with a true definition.

Black's Law Dictionary 835 (4th ed. 1968). GUEST. A "guest" in an automobile is one who takes ride in automobile driven by another person, merely for his own pleasure or on his own business, and without making any return or conferring any benefit on automobile driver. Elliott v. Camper, 8 W.W.Harr. 504, 194 A. 130, 133; Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law and Prac., Perm. Ed., § 2291.

Black's Law Dictionary 269 (4th ed. 1968). CARRIER: Common carriers are those that hold themselves out or undertake to carry persons or goods of all persons indifferently, or of all who choose to employ it, Merchants Parcel Delivery v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission. 150 Pa.Super. 120, 28 A.2d 340, 344; Burnett v. Riter, Tex.Civ. App., 276 S.W. 347, 349; or those whose occupation or business is transportation of persons or things for hire or reward, In re Rodgers, Neb., 279 N.W. 800, 803, 804. Common carriers of passengers are those that undertake to carry all persons indifferently who may apply for passage, so long as there is room, and there is no legal excuse for refusal. Lazor v. Banas, 114 Pa.Super. 425, 174 A. 817, 819; Anderson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 100 Misc. 411, 166 N.Y.S. 640, 642. Private carriers are those who transport or undertake to transport in a particular instance for hire or reward. Allen v. Sackrider, 37 N.Y. 341; Columbus-Cincinnati Trucking Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 141 Ohio St. 228, 47 N.E.2d 623; 625. 626.

BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW RAWLE'S REVISION 1914 page 553
COMMON CARRIERS. One whose business, occupation, or regular calling it is to carry chattels for all persons who may choose to employ and remunerate him. Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 50, 11 Am. Dec. 133 ; Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 353, 46 Am. Dec. 393; Schoul. Bailm. § 345; Naugatuck 'R. Co. v. Button Co., 24 Conn. 479.
The definition includes carriers by land and water. They are, on the one hand, stagecoach and omnibus proprietors, railroad and street railway companies: Spellman v. Transit Co., 36 Neb. S90, 55 N. W. 270, 20 L. R. A. 316, 38 Am. St. Rep. 7.

BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW RAWLE'S REVISION 1914 page 2509
Passenger. One who has taken a place in a public conveyance, by virtue of a contract, for the purpose of being transported from one place to another, on the payment of fare or its equivalent Bricker v. R.Co., 132 Pa. 1, Atl. 983, 19 Am. St. Rep. 585.

A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNION WITH REFERENCES TO THE CIVIL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF FORIEGN LAW by John Bouvier 1839 page 231 (and stated again in)
A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNION WITH REFERENCES TO THE CIVIL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF FORIEGN LAW by John Bouvier 1843 page 282

PASSENGER, cont. One who has taken a place in a public conveyance, for the purpose of being transported from one place to another. For his rights and duties, vide Common Carriers.

From the words of the law there is to be no departure.

Can I have an “automobile” when the designe is for its owner and guests instead of passengers? The Supreme Court has recently declared that people on board something that moved were not passengers as shown in the Lozman case below.

LOZMAN v. CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA 11-626 U.S. Supreme Court 2013
“Transportation” involves the “conveyance (of things or persons) from one place to another.” And we must apply this definition in a “practical,” not a “theoretical,” way.
When it moved, it carried, not passengers or cargo, but at the very most (giving the benefit of any factual ambiguity to the City) only its own furnishings, its owner’s personal effects, and personnel present to assure the home’s safety.

The denial of a conclusion is error in law.

The definition of “automobile” requires an automobile to be designed for commercial use on the roads. That means engaging in transportation to carry paying passengers possibly as a taxi cab. I deny my Grand Marquis was designed for passengers. The plaintiff must prove that mandated design element. If the statute in requiring “passenger” for a design element does not include the same definition that “passenger” meant in law for well over a century as shown above then the statute is void for vagueness and violates the ADA requirements of clear and effective communications from which I could have benefited. To remain on a public way does not mean moving on a public way as “remain” means stationary.

So the law is written.

29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (7) Automobile. "Automobile" means a motor vehicle designed for the conveyance of passengers.

Fraud lies hidden in general expressions.

Black's Law Dictionary 402-403 (4th ed. 1968).
CONVEY. To pass or transmit the title to property from one to another; to transfer property or the title to property by deed or instrument under seal. Used popularly in sense of "assign," "sale," or "transfer." Crookshanks v. Ransbarger, 80 W.Va. 21, 92 S.E. 78, 82; McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn.App. 434, 134 S.W.2d 197, 205.

Convey relates properly to the disposition of real property, not to personal. Dickerman v. Abrahams, 21 Barb., N.Y., 551, 561. To convey real estate is, by an appropriate instrument, to transfer the legal title to it from the present owner to another. Abendroth v. Greenwich, 29 Conn. 356.

CONVEYANCE. In pleading. Introduction or inducement. In real property law. In the strict legal sense, a transfer of legal title to land. In the popular sense, and as generally used by lawyers, it denotes any transfer of title, legal or equitable Chupco v. Chapman, 76 Okl. 201, 170 P. 259, 266. The transfer of the title of land from one person or class of persons to another. Klein v. McNamara, 54 Miss. 105; Alexander v. State, 28 Tex. App. 186, 12 S.W. 595; In re Loes' Will, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 723, 726. An instrument in writing under seal, (anciently termed an "assurance,") by which some estate or interest in lands is transferred from one person to another; such as a deed, mortgage, etc. 2 Bl. Comm. 293, 295, 309.

Conveyance includes every instrument in writing by which any estate or interest in real estate is created, aliened, mortgaged, or assigned, or by which the title to any real estate may be affected in law or equity, except last wills and testaments, leases for a term not exceeding three years, and executory contracts for the sale or purchase of lands. Stearns Lighting & Power Co. v. Central Trust Co., C.C.A.Mich., 223 F. 962, 966; Shraiberg v. Hanson, 138 Minn. 80, 163 N.W. 1032, 1033.

General
Absolute or conditional conveyance. An absolute conveyance is one by which the right or property in a thing is transferred, free of any condition or qualification, by which it might be defeated or changed; as an ordinary deed of lands, in contradistinction to a mortgage, which is a conditional conveyance. Burrill; Falconer v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 69 N.Y. 491; Brown v. United States, C.C.A.Pa., 95 Fed.2d 487, 489.

Fraudulent conveyance. See Fraudulent.
Mesne conveyance. An intermediate conveyance; one occupying an intermediate position in a chain of title between the first grantee and the present holder.

Primary conveyances. Those by means whereof the benefit or estate is created or first arises; as distinguished from those whereby it may be enlarged, restrained, transferred, or extinguished. The term includes feoffment, gift, grant, lease,exchange, and partition, and is opposed to deriva-
tive conveyances, such as release, surrender, confirmation, etc. 2 Bl. Comm. 309.

Secondary conveyances. The name given to that class of conveyances which presuppose some
other conveyance precedent, and only serve to enlarge, confirm, alter, restrain, restore, or transfer
the interest granted by such original conveyance. 2 Bl. Comm. 324. Otherwise termed "derivative
conveyances" (q. v.).

Voluntary conveyance. A conveyance without valuable consideration; such as a deed or settlement in favor of a wife or children. Gentry v.Field, 143 Mo. 399, 45 S.W. 286; Shannon v. Duffield, 218 Ky. 770, 292 S.W. 322, 323; English v. Brown, D.C.N.J., 219 F. 248, 256.

Even statutes that exist solely to offer definitions for vehicle types must follow due process requirements.


Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 US 156 - Supreme Court 1972; This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute, and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. [Citations omitted]
Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that "[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids."

I deny I was informed that my machines require registration according to Maine statutes. I deny an applicable non-commercial registration requirement exists in statute. Being out of compliance with a law that does not exist is impossible.

The presumption is always in favor of the one who denies.

The ADA requires clear and effective communications (including “and” meaning all available options as opposed to “or” meaning one of the possible options) from Maine to people with learning disabilities. I am unable to perceive any sense of the statute that my machine must meet the definition of truck or truck tractor. I have no idea which one I should choose. As only 1 vehicle type can apply it must be my choice which of the 2 vehicle types to choose. This choice allows me to claim the vehicle type that I choose to change an automobile into a combination vehicle. If the state produces evidence that proves which vehicle type is applicable I could not make the decision of which vehicle type was to be applied.

I deny my grand marquis was legally an automobile at the time of the traffic stop in 2017. I deny my grand marquis was designed and used to meet the following statutory requirements: The conveyance of passengers. designed and used primarily to carry property, designed and used exclusively to draw other vehicles while also not being constructed to carry a load thus not being usable to carry property, and was in combination with one or more trailers.

I deny having an automobile and deny that I can legally register my machine as an automobile or otherwise under Maine statute and registration policy. The plaintiff has the burden of proof for each and every element required by the legal definitions applicable to this case to show those elements exist and apply to both my machinery and me.

I ask the Court to explain how a machine can exist that applies the complete legal definition of a 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (7), (15-A), (66 or 86), (88), (90) & §501 (1) automobile while applying “use” requirements without having a trailer hitch and a trailer in tow.

The automobile registration “use” requirement instantly transforms an automobile into a combination vehicle which adds a completely different legal definition and requirement to that of an automobile. What evidence exists that proves I am a person as so defined?

I deny being a person as defined in 29-A M.R.S.A. 101 (54) as I do not believe I could be any other legal or commercial entity as would be required by the use of "any other". Maine Constitution Article 1 Section 3. Religious freedom & the 1st amendment do not allow denial of my belief that I could NOT be such a person because I am a Christian. Ever since I invited Jesus into my heart he lives there. I am a dual entity not an individual. When I became a Christian I cast off the old man and became a new spiritual being, a new creature in Christ. The old nature, the old man, and the natural person were transformed and changed into a new spiritual being. Were I to blaspheme the holy spirit Jesus would leave me. This means Jesus and I are divisible. This denial is based on my strongly held religious belief which makes inapplicable every part of the legal requirements to be a person as defined in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101. Black's Law Dictionary 843 (9th ed. 2009) defines individual as “ 1. Existing as an indivisible entity. 2. Of or relating to a single person or thing, as opposed to a group.”

29-A M.R.S.A. §501 (1)The fee for an automobile, a pickup truck registered for 6,000 pounds or less or a sport utility vehicle used for the conveyance of passengers or interchangeably for passengers or property is $35.

An automobile or sport utility vehicle used for the conveyance of passengers or property is a combination vehicle and may be issued a special plate with the word "combination" instead of "Vacationland."

29-A M.R.S.A. §101 definitions that are applicable to the charge of having an automobile follow.

7.Automobile. "Automobile" means a motor vehicle designed for the conveyance of passengers

15-A Combination vehicle. "Combination vehicle" means a motor vehicle consisting of a truck or truck tractor in combination with one or more trailers or semitrailers.

54. Person. "Person" means an individual, corporation, firm, partnership, joint venture, association, fiduciary, trust, estate or any other legal or commercial entity.

66. Semitrailer. "Semitrailer" means a vehicle: A. Without motive power; B. Designed for being drawn by a motor vehicle; and C. Designed so that some part of its weight and its load rests upon or is carried by that motor vehicle.

86.Trailer. "Trailer" means a vehicle without motive power, designed to carry persons or property and to be drawn by a motor vehicle

88.Truck. "Truck" means a motor vehicle designed and used primarily to carry property. A truck may be used to tow trailers or semitrailers.

90. Truck tractor. "Truck tractor" means a motor vehicle designed and used exclusively to draw other vehicles and not constructed to carry a load other than a part of the weight of the vehicle and the load drawn.

92. Way. "Way" means the entire width between boundary lines of a road, highway, parkway, street or bridge used for vehicular traffic, whether public or private.

If a road can be used not only by vehicular traffic but also is open for use by those more vulnerable users including but not limited to those who walk or use horses that is not a way as defined in law. I deny that any way can therefore exist in law excepting perhaps the interstate highway system. The interstate highway system prohibits every method of travel except for vehicular traffic. If the interstate highway system actually meets the legal definition of a public way including but not limited to the ownership requirements I believe that the interstate alone would be a Maine defined public way.

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 US 914 - Supreme Court 2000
When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning. Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 484-485 (1987) ("It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term"); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S., at 392-393, n. 10 ("As a rule, `a definition which declares what a term "means" . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated' "); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490, 502 (1945); Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 294 U. S. 87, 95-96 (1935) (Cardozo, J.); see also 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.07, p. 152, and n. 10 (5th ed. 1992) (collecting cases). That is to say, the statute, read "as a whole...leads the reader to a definition.

No guilt attaches to a person who is compelled to obey.

To meet any legal definition my Grand Marquis would have to be within Maine's legal definition of “vehicle”. I could not register my Grand Marquis as a vehicle because it does not meet the legal definition found in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (91) as interpreted by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in Burkitt, Inc. v. CHAMPION RD. MACHINERY, 763 A. 2d 106 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2000 when viewed through the lens provided by Hunt v. Drielick, 852 NW 2d 562 - Mich: Supreme Court 2014 (found in words and phrases) while applying the word the Maine Supreme Judicial Court declared was the defining characteristic of a vehicle “convey” from Black's law 4th edition.

Burkitt, Inc. v. CHAMPION RD. MACHINERY, 763 A. 2d 106 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2000. which as stated defines a motor vehicle...required to be registered under Title 29-A, chapter 5 [29-A M.R.S.A. § 351 et seq.]. Title 29-A, in which "vehicle" is defined as follows:

"Vehicle" means a device for conveyance of persons or property on a way. "Vehicle" does not include conveyances propelled or drawn by human power or used exclusively on tracks or snowmobiles...29-A M.R.S.A. § 101(91) Thus, people or property.

Although I deny the word “passengers” includes all people and note that Title 29-A only applies to “persons” not to “people” the Court did state the defining characteristic of a vehicle using the commercial term “convey”.

Hunt v. Drielick, 852 NW 2d 562 - Mich: Supreme Court 2014 (found in words and phrases)
Clause states that there is no coverage under the policy "while a covered `auto' is used to carry property
Further, "use" is defined as "`to employ for some purpose; put into service...defining "employ" as "[t]o engage in the services of; to put to work".
Finally, "carry" is defined as "1. To bear or convey from one place to another; transport.. Applying these definitions, the clause makes clear ...is engaged in conveying property from one place to another
In order to give the phrase "carry property" meaning, we conclude that the clause was intended to more narrowly preclude coverage during the time that the semi-tractor is physically carrying attached property
It follows that the parties intended the phrase "carry property" to mean just that — coverage can only be precluded during the time that the semi-tractor is used to actually transport property
Accordingly, our interpretation of the first clause does not disregard the phrase "is used" but, rather, appreciates the intended meaning of that phrase and the phrase "carry property."
If the parties had intended...whether property was actually attached...there would have been no need to include the phrase “carry property”.
Applying these definitions, the clause makes clear that there is no coverage when the accident occurs during the time that the semi-tractor is engaged in conveying property from one place to another in any business.

If the state had NOT intended to include towing trailers as a requirement why is it in the automobile definition?

Black's Law Dictionary 402 (4th ed. 1968).
CONVEY. To pass or transmit the title to property from one to another; to transfer property or the title to property by deed or instrument under seal. Used popularly in sense of "assign," "sale," or "transfer." Crookshanks v. Ransbarger, 80 W.Va. 21, 92 S.E. 78, 82; McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn.App. 434, 134 S.W.2d 197, 205. Convey relates properly to the disposition of real property, not to personal. Dickerman v. Abrahams, 21 Barb., N.Y., 551, 561. To convey real estate is, by an appropriate instrument, to transfer the legal title to it from the present owner to another. Abendroth v. Greenwich, 29 Conn. 356.
 
I deny my grand marquis is used to legally convey anyone or anything. That requires commercial use which does not apply to private use as household goods.

The word “convey” denotes commercial use excluding personal property, private or personal use for a “vehicle” in 29-A.
Although I fail to understand how I could have violated these statutes if the Court disagrees with my understanding of the law I claim the defense of necessity and invoke the rule of lenity based on vagueness.

US v. LEBREAULT-FELIZ, Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit 2015
The...defense of necessity requires proof that the defendant "(1) was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil, (2) acted to prevent imminent harm, (3) reasonably anticipated a direct causal relationship between his acts and the harm to be averted, and (4) had no legal alternative but to violate the law."


Had I improperly registered my Grand Marquis as an automobile 29-A M.R.S.A. §2103 (1) clearly states that improper registration would have been a Class E crime as vehicle type is a material fact. People have been convicted for registering a vehicle as the wrong type. In addition to that potential legal punishment 29-A M.R.S.A. §2103 (5 E) instantly changes a traffic infraction for a burned out taillight into a Class D crime. If I happen to have a “deadly weapon” in my possession that further upgrades a traffic infraction into a Class C crime. The material statement of fact on an application form or (as implied in law) on the completed registration of “automobile” as vehicle type could result in 5 years of my life being spent in prison, make me a federal felon, and remove my right to own firearms forever. That exceptionally harsh punishment involving incarceration and heavy fines was far to much punishment for me to risk making an improper and illegal statement of vehicle type or to accept an improper vehicle type on a completed registration certificate.

A person may be capable and incapable at different times.

The A.D.A. including but not limited to 28 CFR §35.130, §35.150, §35.160, and §35.164 requires the legislature to ensure that I am provided clear and effective communications from which I can benefit when they write and publish a statute. Language must not be confusing or vague. Definitions not provided by a statute must be comparable to the definitions that I know and use. Statutes may not utilize special or legal definitions that arise outside of the definitions chapter when they are not the same as normal definitions I know and use if they will provide effective communications.

Davis v. Wechsler, 263 US 22 - Supreme Court 1923; “the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice.”

This case brings federal law and federal requirements with it. I assert my federal rights. Title II of the A.D.A. which includes 28 CFR §35 must be applied. Title II of the A.D.A. requires clear and effective communications. It requires that I also obtain a benefit. When viewed in its entirety a statute must be readily usable and accessible to me. Pay particular attention to 28 CFR §35.130, §35.150, and §35.160. If I was and am unable to read, understand, and properly apply a statute taking my certified learning disabilities into consideration my federal A.D.A. right to obtain clear and effective communications from which a benefit must be obtained could be violated.

The A.D.A. requires clear communications as does basic jurisprudence. I have to be given fair notice clearly stating what is forbidden or required by any statute.

Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 US 156 - Supreme Court 1972; This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617, and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242.

Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that "[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453. The poor among us, the minorities, the average house-holder are not alerted to the regulatory schemes and we assume they would have no understanding of their meaning and impact if they read them.

A direction by a legislature to the police to arrest all "suspicious" persons would not pass constitutional muster. (end case quotes)

If law enforcement officers are required by the legislature to stop everyone that has registration plates displayed horizontally; the position currently required by law, that directive would not pass constitutional muster.

The Court recognized in 1972 that legalese, vague, and confusing language in statutes, Court rules, and other documents must be applied by the Court while assuming that I do not and can not understand their meaning and impact being unlikely to know the intended meaning. The A.D.A. also requires consideration for those with learning disabilities that we may utilize statutes as they are written.

Ballentine's Law Dictionary 1087 (3rd ed. 1969)
Remain. To stay in a place. To be left after others or things have departed or been taken away.

What is the law involved that I was supposed to have violated? I deny this applies to me or my machines. The plaintiff must prove otherwise. “Remains on a public way” must be read to mean abandoned on a public way per Ballentine's definition. To be left after others have departed can not be understood to mean moving along or waiting at a red light or stop sign. That requirement can only be read to not allow permanently abandoning a vehicle on a way. If some other meaning is intended I did not get clear and effective communications from the state as required by federal ADA law.

I deny my grand marquis's use of any public way is prohibited or restricted by law. I deny the lack of authorized access to use a public way. The plaintiff must prove otherwise. Being on a public way is legal unless restricted by law and the restriction is proven to apply..

Everything that the law does not forbid is permitted.


29-A M.R.S.A. §102. Public way use authorized; Any vehicle may be operated on a public way unless prohibited or restricted by this Title, by special law or municipal ordinance, or by rule of the department.

When any essential part has been removed, the whole is removed (or destroyed).


29-A M.R.S.A. §351. Registration required
The owner of a vehicle that is operated or remains on a public way is responsible for registering the vehicle.
1.Failure to register. A person who operates a vehicle that is not registered in accordance with this Title, fails to register a vehicle or permits a vehicle that is not registered to remain on a public way

1-A. Residents required to register. An owner of a vehicle who becomes a resident of this State shall register that vehicle in this State within 30 days of establishing residency.

A presumption yields to the truth.


I have wanted to leave Maine for many years. I deny establishing residency. I hate being cold to much to want to establish residency where the furnace runs 9 months out of 12. Finances alone have prevented me from leaving Maine. Being stuck in a location because leaving for the place I want to live is not yet financially possible does not make me a resident of Maine.

The state has to prove every element involved in the charge. This includes person as defined in 29-A 101-54, public way as defined in §101-59, vehicle as defined in §101-91 and the Burkitt case of 2000 while applying the legal definition of “convey”, and to prove that a vehicle type determined in the charge as an automobile as defined in §101-7, 15-a, 88, and 90 as found in §101 that also requires registration from chapter 5.

Cookson v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 34 A. 3d 1156 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2012
the type of vehicle that is usually subject to registration requires a closer examination of the motor vehicle statute
The statute explicitly qualifies the registration requirements for all vehicles by providing that only a "vehicle that is operated or remains on a public way" must be registered.
because pickup trucks are tantamount to passenger cars; both are presumed to be driven on public ways (end case quote)

All presumptions are in favor of life, liberty, and innocence.


I am to be presumed innocent of every single one of the elements and parts involved in any charge claimed against me. Presuming that my machine is a pickup truck or automobile as defined in statute and required by law must be proven. Presuming that my machine was driven on a public way violates my right to be considered innocent until proven guilty. Does a public way exist in Maine as legally defined? I deny a public way exists. The plaintiff has to prove a public way does exist as defined in law which includes proving all ownership claims necessary.

It is unjust for freeborn individuals not to have the free disposal of their own property.

A person who exercises his own rights injures no one.


29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (59) Public way. "Public way" means a way, owned and maintained by the State, a county or a municipality, over which the general public has a right to pass.


The law is the rule of right; and whatever is contrary to the rule of right is an injury.

The statute recognizes my right to pass on a way but then attempts to remove that right thus injuring me and removing some of my unalienable liberty. This statute has clarified the issues and requirements relating to a public way that must be proven.
1. The public has the right to pass over a public way. A right can not be licensed or have a fee connected to its use.
2. The public is declared to be separate entities from the governmental entities or they would not have been mentioned separately. It is to obvious to require declaration that the government would never need to proclaim in a statute that it has the right to use its own property.
3. To exist as a public way the government must have total and complete; not partial ownership of the way. No other ownership can exist or be proclaimed for a public way to exist.
4. The government must maintain the ways. With many roads (or ways) in Maine being in various states of disrepair have the ways truly been maintained by the government? I think not!
Is the claim of ownership by a governmental entity as required to have a public way proper and true? Who has true ownership of the ways? If the ways do not belong to the government then no public way can legally exist in Maine. No motor vehicle violation would then be possible to commit.

§101- 92.Way. "Way" means the entire width between boundary lines of a road, highway, parkway, street or bridge used for vehicular traffic, whether public or private.

Laws should bind their own author.

Does the government actually own the way or does it merely have a right of way allowing use of that width?

Packard v. Banton, 264 US 140 - Supreme Court 1924
The streets belong to the public and are primarily for the use of the public in the ordinary way. Their use for the purposes of gain is special and extraordinary and, generally at least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems proper.

Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 US 106 - Supreme Court 1949
The streets belong to the public and are primarily for the use of the public in the ordinary way. Their use for the purposes of gain is special and extraordinary and, generally at least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems proper. Certainly the presence or absence of hire has been the hook by which much highway regulation has been supported.

City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 US 750 - Supreme Court 1988
The streets belong to the public and are primarily for the use of the public in the ordinary way.
I deny the claimed ownership of the streets also referred to as “ways” is legally correct. The Supreme Court of the U.S.A. has declared the government is not the sole owner of the streets which means no legally defined public way exists in Maine.

City of Rockland v. Johnson, 267 A. 2d 382 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1970
In Burr v. Stevens, supra,( Burr v. Stevens, 90 Me. 500 - 1897 ) the Court said:
"The owner of land over which a highway is laid retains his right in the soil for all purposes which are consistent with the full enjoyment of the easement acquired by the public. This right of the owner may grow less and less as the public needs increase. But at all times he retains all that is not needed for public uses, subject, however, to municipal or police regulations."

Sleeper v. Loring, 83 A. 3d 769 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2013; A right-of-way is legally defined as a legal right to pass through property owned by another. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1326 (7th ed. 1999).


The land owner owns the width between the boundary lines of a way. The government has obtained a right of access otherwise known as a right of way over that land as opposed to total legal ownership of that property. Although the land a way is on may be regulated, the title for that way remains with the landowner. Once again, the Court has declared the ways do not belong to a governmental entity but rather declared that a way belongs to others.
There are enough Court decisions above to tell me the streets belong not to governmental entities but instead belong to the public. The government was never given complete and true ownership of the streets. Instead it was only given the authority and requirement by the people of Maine to perform maintenance and to provide upkeep for those streets owned by we the people of Maine.

I deny the public surrendered their ownership of the streets. I deny ownership of the streets and the absolute right to use the streets in any reasonable manner was ever surrendered to the government. I deny the state paid the public to buy the streets the public owns. Therefore I deny the state, county, or municipality own the streets.

I deny the streets are not owned by the public as tenants in common. I deny that each one of the people of Maine does not own a share of the streets. The government has only the authority it has received from the people. There is no authority in any one of the people to charge other people to access the streets, If one of the people alone lacks the authority to charge to use the streets for private use then the approximately 1.3 million people of Maine when combined together can not possess that authority either and thus are unable to pass such authority to the state.

All power is inherent in the people. The word People refers to one or many. As one of the people of Maine I deny that I do not possess all power within myself. I deny that sovereign immunity can be denied regarding my legal status based on my status as a free white man per the Maine & USA Constitutions and supreme court precedent.

Maine Constitution Preamble
. We the people of Maine, in order to establish justice, insure tranquility, provide for our mutual defense, promote our common welfare, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of liberty, acknowledging with grateful hearts the goodness of the Sovereign Ruler of the Universe in affording us an opportunity, so favorable to the design; and, imploring God's aid and direction in its accomplishment, do agree to form ourselves into a free and independent State, by the style and title of the State of Maine and do ordain and establish the following Constitution for the government of the same.
Ownership of the roads was not expressly transferred or given to the State by the preamble or in any other part of the Constitution of the State of Maine. Blocking access to the roads unless the government is paid an access fee is removing our liberty which the Constitution preamble expressly says must be provided. The state does not respect or acknowledge the public's ownership rights.

No one can be forced to pay access fees to enter and use what they have even partial ownership of barring a contract signed by all partners with ownership rights. Without the required ownership by a governmental entity no public way can legally exist in Maine as shown by the 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (59) declaration of ownership.

I know not if the current status of statutory requirements was done on purpose because the legislature recognizes the people are sovereign and can not be regulated in their private capacity without their permission or if this is a result of modifying statutes over time. Regardless of how the law came to be written this way the law is crystal clear. The law put forth in Title 29-A does not apply to me or my machines.

The practice of adding and annulling laws is a most dangerous one.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US 218 - Supreme Court 1973
That which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex and mysterious.
To preserve the fairness of the trial process the Court established an appropriately heavy burden on the Government before waiver could be found—"an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
As Mr. Justice Harlan once wrote: "The sound reason why [the right to counsel] is so freely extended for a criminal trial is the severe injustice risked by confronting an untrained defendant with a range of technical points of law, evidence, and tactics familiar to the prosecutor but not to himself.

I do not receive communications as effectively as BAR members do from Maine statutes. That potentially ineffective communication would violate my A.D.A. rights. My learning disabilities require simple and concise communications. Statutes use the language of the Court a language which is incompatible with the language I normally use as the definitions are very different. I find such communications incomprehensible without interpretation into plain language. Despite having looked up some legal definitions I can not be expected or required to act as my own interpreter. I can not be expected to hire a lawyer at my expense for the sole purpose of having that lawyer act as an interpreter to help me understand the confusing and incomprehensible communications presented by the State of Maine in its written communications which may include statutes and rules of Court.

28 CFR § 35.160 General.
(a) (1) A public entity shall take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, members of the public, and companions with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.
(b) (1) A public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford qualified individuals with disabilities, including applicants, participants, companions, and members of the public, an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity of a public entity.
(2) The type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure effective communication will vary in accordance with the method of communication used by the individual; the nature, length, and complexity of the communication involved; and the context in which the communication is taking place. In determining what types of auxiliary aids and services are necessary, a public entity shall give primary consideration to the requests of individuals with disabilities. In order to be effective, auxiliary aids and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in such a way as to protect the privacy and independence of the individual with a disability.
(c) (1) A public entity shall not require an individual with a disability to bring another individual to interpret for him or her.
(2) A public entity shall not rely on an adult accompanying an individual with a disability to interpret or facilitate communication except— (i) In an emergency involving an imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public where there is no interpreter available; or (ii) Where the individual with a disability specifically requests that the accompanying adult interpret or facilitate communication, the accompanying adult agrees to provide such assistance, and reliance on that adult for such assistance is appropriate under the circumstances.

If 29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1) does not mean horizontal which means reaching out to the horizon and includes flat then I did not receive clear and effective communications. I would point out that used car dealers often place their registration plates mounted on magnets flat on the trunk lid of a car without attracting police attention. Should I be treated differently?

If the plain meaning of the text as I am able to understand it was not presented in the language of the common man and is not so applied we are not only without the rule of law but we have also encountered a violation of the A.D.A..

Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 US 511 - Supreme Court 1993
Respondents do not dispute the plain meaning of this text. Rather, they argue that when §525 is read in the context of the entire statute, it implicitly... They make three points in support of this argument: that the history of the Act reveals an intent...; that other provisions of the Act are expressly conditioned on a showing of prejudice; and that a literal interpretation produces illogical and absurd results. Neither separately nor in combination do these points justify a departure from the unambiguous statutory text.

Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment.
The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators. As the Court said in 1844: "The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself . . . ." Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 9, 24 (emphasis added). But not the least of the defects of legislative history is its indeterminacy. If one were to search for an interpretive technique that, on the whole, was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more promising candidate than legislative history. And the present case nicely proves that point.
Judge Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends.
That is not merely a waste of research time and ink; it is a false and disruptive lesson in the law. It says to the bar that even an "unambiguous [and] unequivocal" statute can never be dispositive; that, presumably under penalty of malpractice liability, the oracles of legislative history, far into the dimmy past, must always be consulted. This undermines the clarity of law, and condemns litigants (who, unlike us, must pay for it out of their own pockets) to subsidizing historical research by lawyers.

One of the problems with legislative history is that it is inherently open ended. In this case, for example, one could go back further in time to examine the Civil War-era relief Acts.


In order to obtain a registration certificate requires a payment of an excise tax and a registration fee is required. The registration requirement as shown in statute therefore results in a taxing statute.

United States v. Merriam, 263 US 179 - Supreme Court 1923; in statutes levying taxes the literal meaning of the words employed is most important, for such statutes are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. If the words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the Government and in favor of the taxpayer. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153.
if there be admissible in any statute, what is called an equitable construction, certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute, where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute.

Federal Constitutional & A.D.A. rights based on my learning disabilities are not to be frustrated or ignored.

State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1973
even if the State Court's recent interpretation be consistent with the basic spirit of the law of the State and the State Court is clearly acting in good faith and with intellectual honesty—if the law of the State uses concepts arbitrarily, or assigns to them significance contrary to standards of meaning properly cognizable as normative, a federal tribunal may reject the State Court's interpretation when acceptance of it will frustrate federal constitutional protections.

Luria v. United States, 231 US 9 - Supreme Court 1913
Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty of protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other. Under our Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native citizen in all respects, save that of eligibility to the Presidency. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 165; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 101; Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 827.

If the political society decides that it does not owe me a duty of protection then I have no duty of allegiance to it. If I have no duty of allegiance to that society I have no duty to obey that society or any of its rules. I must be compensated for my allegiance. If I do not receive a complete offer of protection within reasonable bounds then the contract is broken. I am thererby free of that obligation due to lack of compensation. The question to be looked at is simple. Does society truly protect me or does it say it has no duty to protect me when it has that ability? The Supreme Court in Castle rock says the community has no duty to protect me. That statement denying protection released me from any obligation to a community.

Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 US 748 - Supreme Court 2005
Respondent claims the benefit of this provision on the ground that she had a property interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her husband; and that the town deprived her of this property without due process by having a policy that tolerated nonenforcement of restraining orders.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, we left a similar question unanswered in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U. S. 189 (1989), another case with "undeniably tragic" facts: Local child-protection officials had failed to protect a young boy from beatings by his father that left him severely brain damaged. Id., at 191-193. We held that the so-called "substantive" component of the Due Process Clause does not "requir[e] the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors." Id., at 195. We noted, however, that the petitioner had not properly preserved the argument that—and we thus "decline[d] to consider" whether—state "child protection statutes gave [him] an `entitlement' to receive protective services in accordance with the terms of the statute, an entitlement which would enjoy due process protection." Id., at 195, n. 2.
The procedural component of the Due Process Clause does not protect everything that might be described as a "benefit": "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire" and "more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."

Our cases recognize that a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.
Resolution of the federal issue begins, however, with a determination of what it is that state law provides. In the context of the present case, the central state-law question is whether Colorado law gave respondent a right to police enforcement of the restraining order.
The critical language in the restraining order came not from any part of the order itself (which was signed by the state-court trial judge and directed to the restrained party, respondent's husband), but from the preprinted notice to law-enforcement personnel that appeared on the back of the order

"(a) Whenever a restraining order is issued, the protected person shall be provided with a copy of such order. A peace officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order.
"(b) A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person when the peace officer has information amounting to probable cause that:
"(I) The restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of a restraining order; and
"(II) The restrained person has been properly served with a copy of the restraining order or the restrained person has received actual notice of the existence and substance of such order.
"(c) In making the probable cause determination described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (3), a peace officer shall assume that the information received from the registry is accurate. A peace officer shall enforce a valid restraining order whether or not there is a record of the restraining order in the registry." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.5(3) (Lexis 1999) (emphases added).

We do not believe that these provisions of Colorado law truly made enforcement of restraining orders mandatory.
The serving of public rather than private ends is the normal course of the criminal law because criminal acts, "besides the injury [they do] to individuals, . . . strike at the very being of society; which cannot possibly subsist, where actions of this sort are suffered to escape with impunity." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 5 (1769)

Perhaps most radically, the alleged property interest here arises incidentally, not out of some new species of government benefit or service, but out of a function that government actors have always performed—to wit, arresting people who they have probable cause to believe have committed a criminal offense.[13]
The indirect nature of a benefit was fatal to the due process claim of the nursing-home residents in O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U. S. 773 (1980).
We conclude, therefore, that respondent did not, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, have a property interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her husband.
In light of today's decision and that in DeShaney, the benefit that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its "substantive" manifestations
The Supreme Court in Castle Rock has outright declared the government has no duty to protect the individual. Society only protects the public because that protection prevents injury that would otherwise strike at and injure the same society itself which chooses only to protect itself not the individual.
The duty of protection agreed to obviously excludes protection of and for the individual. The public at large which apparently means the society itself has a duty of allegiance to the society which it already is. The individual has no duty of allegiance to or need to obey that society as they can not expect to receive needed protection from that society as compensation. Compensation must be given to the individual for the contract with society to be in force.
Luria v. United States showed the existence of an unenumerated individual (as compared to a collective) right to protection from the government society that is required in return for government allegiance by each individual. (end case quotes)


The government society speaking through the Supreme Court in Luria v. United States, 231 US 9 - Supreme Court 1913 explained the nature of the reciprocal arrangement between the one man, woman, or child and the society. The same Supreme Court in Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 US 748 - Supreme Court 2005 showed us that essential contract requirements it recognizes as mandatory have been violated. Mandatory membership in a political society was removed when the Supreme Court in Castle Rock declared the contract had been destroyed. No government society mandatory membership requirement has existed since at least 2005. I do not choose to opt into that society.

The right of protection as compensation for allegiance is a 9th amendment and a Me. Const. Art. 1 section 24 right which has been violated. Whereas this right has been violated the State has violated its corporate charter and ceased to exist after it chose to commit suicide by this action.
The State of Maine has also chosen to violate the right to trial by jury for all civil suits as required. By removing this protection clearly mandated by Maine's constitution and required for traffic infractions the state removed its protection of my rights from me. No state can expect allegiance or obedience after removing its guarantee of mandatory protection of my rights as compensation for that allegiance

The state must prove jurisdiction. What evidence exists to prove beyond any that the statutes and Constitution of Maine apply to me just because of my physical location? Although writing on paper may claim to have jurisdiction what proof exists proving that claim is legitimate? I can write on paper claiming to have jurisdiction and control over every judge but would that foolish statement being written down make it true? Jurisdiction must be proven. It can not be assumed or presumed. To assume that a written document from a time before I was born applies to me is illogical unless proof of that applicability exists.

I ask how less than 18,000 white men who voted for the Constitution of Maine to be approved as a Government to control persons as part of the Missouri compromise can bind 1.3 million people today. When the vote was taken approximately 77,000 men and 75,000 women age 16 and over were in Maine per the census. When less than 18,000 free men voted to bind themselves and less than 8,000 voted against becoming a state in 1820 when approximately 298,000 people lived here how can it be said the people agreed? Less than 1/6 of those of age voted. How does that choice by others apply to me almost 200 years later? What evidence exists to prove future generations including the 1.3 million now living here can be bound, enslaved, or controlled based solely on the written will of less than 18,000 men dead for more than a century after the 13th amendment was passed? When a man dies every unmet obligation he had for a contract died with him. His left over obligations can not be required to be honored by their descendants except for what can be paid from the remaining estate of the dead man.

I deny that generational debts or obligations can exist as a matter of law. I deny that debt or obligation can be passed from the dead to the living.
The State of Maine also committed suicide by stepping outside its corporate charter requires and thus ceased to exist based on the USA constitution probably in the 1960's. When Maine became a state as part of the Missouri compromise it was immediately inducted into the United States of America and that U.S.A. Constitution and its requirements were added to those in Maine's Constitution. Among those requirements we find

Constitution of the United States

Article 1 Section 10
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.


The State of Maine has violated that federal Constitutional duty by paying its debts with federal reserve notes without silver or gold backing them. Maine does not pay its debts with actual gold or silver coin or a means that has a ready conversion to such coins. The State of Maine has violated its corporate charters. It has ceased to exist as a matter of law as a result of violating specified sections of its corporate charters. A corporation that has violated its founding charter no longer exists in law. A corporation that has ceased to exist can not be injured or make any claim against any man.

Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs of Everglades Drainage Dist., 258 US 338 - Supreme Court 1922

To say that the legislature simply was establishing the situation as both parties knew from the beginning it ought to be would be putting something of a gloss upon the facts. We must assume that the plaintiff went through the canal relying upon its legal rights and it is not to be deprived of them because the Legislature forgot.

29-A M.R.S.A. §102. Public way use authorized; Any vehicle may be operated on a public way unless prohibited or restricted by this Title, by special law or municipal ordinance, or by rule of the department.

The state must declare in a limiting statute where all other limitations exist if use is otherwise restricted. Clear and effective communications require an express statement referencing all limitations and where the sections where they may be found . I can not be expected to be a legal scholar and to search every word ever printed to find some limitation that may not exist. I do not have 20 years to search through all possible restrictions that could exist literally anywhere. This lack of reference ignores the clear and effective communications that I require to receive a benefit per 28 CFR §35.130, §35.150, & §35.160.
I depended on my rights to use the streets that I have ownership rights in as I am part of the public. If the legislature forgot to include requirements limiting access to the streets for my Grand Marquis, Dodge Ram, & trailers my rights control. No registration is due under Maine statute. Bringing me to Court, claiming that I have a duty which does not exist, and then attempting to convince a judge that I must pay what I do not owe is nothing short of criminal extortion by State of Maine.

Extortion is a crime when, by color of office, any person extorts what is not due, or more than due, or before the time when it is due.
I am a free white Man. I stand in that capacity recognized by the supreme court in 1793 and 1854. I am one of the people of Maine. I deny I am a “person” or have a “persona” as a term of civil law. The plaintiff must prove that I am a person as defined in statute and as used in Maine's constitution.

"Man" is a term of nature; "person" (persona), a term of civil law.

I finish this case with one final thought for the Court to consider. Long ago men far wiser than I put forth the following maxim of law: If you depart from the law, you will wander (without a guide), and everything will be in a state of uncertainty to everyone.

The ignorance of the judge is the misfortune of the innocent.


If a judge ignores the legal requirements and illegally determine an automobile is not as defined and avoids the literal registration requirements that are shown clearly in this case will any law ever be understandable by anyone or will everything in law end up in a perpetual state of uncertainty and confusion? A.D.A. law is on the next 2 pages.

When the foundation has been removed (or demolished), the structure collapses.


"Facilities" is not specifically defined within the ADA.

Black's law dictionary 591 (6th ed. 1990) Facilities. That which promotes the ease of any action, operation, transaction, or course of conduct. The term normally denotes inanimate means rather than human agencies, though it may also include animate beings such as persons, people and groups thereof. Cheney v. Tolliver, 234 Ark. 973, 356 S.W.2d 636, 638."

When the people working at the Court refuse to explain the rules of Court and Court procedure they violate this ADA requirement. Clerks calling an ADA request to understand the rules of Court and trial procedure and steps that a man with a mental impairment will soon be under as asking for "legal advice" does not change the ADA's requirements regarding accommodation and use of the facilities. If the clerk does not have the knowledge required to complete this type of reasonable request they are then responsible to find another person who can impart that knowledge to me even if that requires getting a guard, lawyer, district attorney, or a judge that can explain the rules of Court and the steps a trial goes through.



28 CFR § 35.130 General prohibitions against discrimination (a) No qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity.
(b) (1) A public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not, directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the basis of disability— (i) Deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service;
(ii) Afford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others;
(vii) Otherwise limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid, benefit, or service.
(2) A public entity may not deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in services, programs, or activities that are not separate or different, despite the existence of permissibly separate or different programs or activities.
(7) (i) A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.
(d) A public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.
§ 35.150 Existing facilities
(a) General. A public entity shall operate each service, program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.
§ 35.160 General.
(a) (1) A public entity shall take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, members of the public, and companions with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.
(b) (1) A public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford qualified individuals with disabilities, including applicants, participants, companions, and members of the public, an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity of a public entity.
(2) The type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure effective communication will vary in accordance with the method of communication used by the individual; the nature, length, and complexity of the communication involved; and the context in which the communication is taking place. In determining what types of auxiliary aids and services are necessary, a public entity shall give primary consideration to the requests of individuals with disabilities. In order to be effective, auxiliary aids and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in such a way as to protect the privacy and independence of the individual with a disability.
(c) (1) A public entity shall not require an individual with a disability to bring another individual to interpret for him or her.
(2) A public entity shall not rely on an adult accompanying an individual with a disability to interpret or facilitate communication except— (i) In an emergency involving an imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public where there is no interpreter available; or
(ii) Where the individual with a disability specifically requests that the accompanying adult interpret or facilitate communication, the accompanying adult agrees to provide such assistance, and reliance on that adult for such assistance is appropriate under the circumstances.
§ 35.164 Duties
This subpart does not require a public entity to take any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens. In those circumstances where personnel of the public entity believe that the proposed action would fundamentally alter the service, program, or activity or would result in undue financial and administrative burdens, a public entity has the burden of proving that compliance with this subpart would result in such alteration or burdens. The decision that compliance would result in such alteration or burdens must be made by the head of the public entity or his or her designee after considering all resources available for use in the funding and operation of the service, program, or activity and must be accompanied by a written statement of the reasons for reaching that conclusion. If an action required to comply with this subpart would result in such an alteration or such burdens, a public entity shall take any other action that would not result in such an alteration or such burdens but would nevertheless ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, individuals with disabilities receive the benefits or services provided by the public entity.

State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1973
even if the State Court's recent interpretation be consistent with the basic spirit of the law of the State and the State Court is clearly acting in good faith and with intellectual honesty—if the law of the State uses concepts arbitrarily, or assigns to them significance contrary to standards of meaning properly cognizable as normative, a federal tribunal may reject the State Court's interpretation when acceptance of it will frustrate federal constitutional protections.

The same logic applies to federal A.D.A. rights and protections as to the rights mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.
There is a reason that LEO has a new meaning: Legally Entitled to Oppress. Thanks to Bob Livingston for this one.

Williams v. United States, 341 US 97 - Supreme Court 1951
It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court.

Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 US 54 - Supreme Court 1795
Judges may die, and courts be at an end; but justice still lives, and, though she may sleep for a while, will eventually awake, and must be satisfied
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Re: My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Postby country_hick » Fri Apr 14, 2017 10:57 pm

After the officer has testified. The following questions are what will be asked in cross examination

(Part 1 are you an honest cop?)

(Officer) Have you ever been in a trial before? When was your first trial?

At your prior trials did you swear or affirm to tell the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Was there a time limit given for your oath to tell the truth or was it given without a stated timeframe or conditions? Without any exceptions being stated in that oath the oath was and is an unconditional lifetime oath requiring 100% honesty at all times forever without any exceptions just like the oath given when joining the military is a lifetime oath.

Since the time you first took that oath have you said anything that was not 100% truth and the entire truth without leaving anything out for any reason including being nice, polite, or considerate or during an interrogation or for any other reason?

2 possible response to the answer from the above question.
1 Do you really expect this court to believe you have not fudged the facts to be nice and did not use strategic deception during any investigation you have been involved in after your first trial ended? (or)
2. You admit you have lied. As you have admitted that you committed perjury why should any of your testimony be accepted as you have admitted you are a liar who violated your solemn oath?

If you were not 100% honest or lied to anyone at any time after your first trial how would that action not have been perjury based on that lifetime oath of telling the truth?

(Part 2 do you know the law?)

Do you know and understand the law you said I violated? (perjury trap)

If you understand and know the law you can tell this court what the law says and means.

§452. Manner of display . 1. Position of registration plate. A registration plate must be displayed horizontally.

Do you know the difference between horizontal and vertical? What does vertical mean? What is the difference between horizontal and vertical?

If I lay something flat on the ground is that horizontal? Is flat included within the meaning of the word horizontal?

Did I have registration plates? Was the painted side of the registration plate on top or on the back side unable to be seen?

Was my registration plate displayed in a vertical position? No? It must have been missing or horizontal. Were the registration plates missing?

If you stopped me for being within the laws requirements then all other charges must be fruit of the poisonous tree. They were made only after you stopped me for having a horizontal display per law.

What evidence supported by statute do you have to prove that non-commercial use of the streets by my grand marquis requires registration?

What evidence do you have to prove my grand marquis requires registration?

(29-A 501 (1) would be the only possible but incorrect reply)

What is a vehicle? What is a public way? What is a way? What is a person? Where is each one of those terms defined?

29-A M.R.S.A. 101 (59), (92), (54).


(Part 3 where is your evidence?)

What evidence do you have to prove that I have a vehicle, automobile, am a person, or a public way exists and was involved as defined in Maine statute and case law?

The paper I was given said my machine type was 4 door. Where is 4 door defined and requiring registration per title 29-A? (No 4 door definition exists.)

Was a trailer being towed by my grand marquis when I was stopped? (No.)

How many statutes are required to prove that I have an automobile as defined by Maine statute? (6 statutes total shown 3 lines later.)

Did my grand marquis have a trailer hitch installed when you stopped me? (No.)

Where is automobile, truck, truck tractor, combination vehicle, semi-trailer, and trailer defined?

29-A M.R.S.A 501 (1) 101 (7), (66), (86), (88), (15-A), and (90).

What is a combination vehicle? What is a truck? What is a truck tractor? What is a trailer? What is a semi-trailer? What is an automobile?

Can you prove my grand marquis is a combination vehicle, truck, truck tractor, had a trailer, was designed for passengers, carries passengers, carries property, or requires registration?
(The deputy will be thinking something like...I wasn't taught this or the definitions...HELP!)


(Part 4 where is the claimant?)

I now call the plaintiff, the claimant, State of Maine to the stand.

If state of Maine did not appear then the plaintiff has surrendered this claim by not following the forum of the thing in dispute. No representative can answer questions asked directly of the plaintiff.

How did I injure you? What was that injury? Why do you deserve to have me pay you for damages?

Why do you claim I owed you any duty? How did I obtain that obligation? Where is your signed complaint? Are you claiming injuries to yourself or to others? How can a legal fiction be injured? Did I tear or rip your corporate papers?

When State of Maine has violated its corporate charter by not applying its constitution exactly as it was voted on by the people of Maine in 1820 how can you claim not to be outside your corporate charter authority? When a corporation steps outside its corporate charter does it cease to legally exist?
There is a reason that LEO has a new meaning: Legally Entitled to Oppress. Thanks to Bob Livingston for this one.

Williams v. United States, 341 US 97 - Supreme Court 1951
It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court.

Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 US 54 - Supreme Court 1795
Judges may die, and courts be at an end; but justice still lives, and, though she may sleep for a while, will eventually awake, and must be satisfied
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Re: My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Postby country_hick » Tue Apr 18, 2017 10:23 pm

The case (yet to have a court date assigned) has just been seriously damaged for the prosecution by the Maine supreme judicial court. In the appeal regarding my dodge rams registration I was told my claim that I did not require registration based on section 351 was "without merit"...end of analysis and statement... I have a new charge on the same statutes. I presented a motion. I asked to have the MSJC explain what I did not understand so I could say I understood the charge in the new case. The court said it took my A.D.A. requests as a request to reopen the case. I asked for clear and effective communications from which I could benefit. Apparently the court would not understand the A.D.A. if it was read in front of them by its authors.

Now when asked at trial If I understand the charge against me I get to say "No sir. I do not understand the charge. The Maine supreme judicial court told me I do not understand 351 but did not let me know what I do not understand about it. Under the principle of stare decisis this court must accept that I do not understand this charge and I am unable to understand what I do not understand about it because I was not told what I do not understand about it sir."
There is a reason that LEO has a new meaning: Legally Entitled to Oppress. Thanks to Bob Livingston for this one.

Williams v. United States, 341 US 97 - Supreme Court 1951
It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court.

Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 US 54 - Supreme Court 1795
Judges may die, and courts be at an end; but justice still lives, and, though she may sleep for a while, will eventually awake, and must be satisfied
User avatar
country_hick
Freeman
 
Posts: 751
Joined: Thu Feb 04, 2016 2:19 am
Has thanked: 1 time
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