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My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Discuss right to travel in the world and Public highway.

Re: My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Postby country_hick » Thu Mar 09, 2017 7:21 pm

wealllbe20 wrote:You are a damn good researcher for having a "learning disability" :beerbang:

Thank you. I have an IQ over 120 but comprehension is much lower. I can learn things. However, poor presentment of ideas, facts, and statements and some types of language and sentence construction confuses and frustrates me to no end. I am a 2E. (look it up)
http://www.dogpile.com/search/web?fcoid=417&fcop=topnav&fpid=27&q=2e&ql= (look for web results past the ads)

Researching is easy. Think, ask, read, then apply results.
Figuring out legalese and Court rules is almost impossible. It is designed to confuse.

What no amount of research can provide is an understanding of how judges can make determinations against what was obviously not proven.
Last edited by country_hick on Fri Mar 31, 2017 8:52 pm, edited 1 time in total.
There is a reason that LEO has a new meaning: Legally Entitled to Oppress. Thanks to Bob Livingston for this one.

Williams v. United States, 341 US 97 - Supreme Court 1951
It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court.

Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 US 54 - Supreme Court 1795
Judges may die, and courts be at an end; but justice still lives, and, though she may sleep for a while, will eventually awake, and must be satisfied

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Re: My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Postby country_hick » Fri Mar 31, 2017 4:57 pm

This is a work in progress. Maxims of law are in bold. I expect this document to get much longer.

I have yet to explain why the legislature made the law this way including the 9th amendment that kept our common law right intact (case law to be cited) to travel in any reasonable way on a road. (end online introduction to the document)

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

What is a man to do when the law is at odds with itself? The law literally read demands that a man act like a criminal to appear innocent. Imagine discovering you would be treated like a criminal if you actually follow the law as it is written. The law does not allow registration but does not recognize legal lack of registration. I do not have an automobile as legally defined. What a conundrum!

Let justice be done though the heavens fall.

The burden of the proof rests on the person who affirms, not the one who denies.

State v. Sklar, 317 A. 2d 160 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1974; This Court has long recognized that "governmental fair play" is the essence of "due process."

An error in law injures.

I require judicial notice and judicial cognizance be taken of all primary and secondary sources of law as well as maxims of law presented within this document.

Black's Law Dictionary 984 (4th ed. 1968). JUDICIAL COGNIZANCE. Judicial notice, or knowledge upon which a judge is bound to act without having it proved in evidence.


Reading Title 29-A a few times does not provide a true understanding of that title.

The laws consist not in reading but in understanding.

The presumption is always in favor of the one who denies.

I deny it is possible or required to register my machines under current Maine law. I deny Title 29-A applies to me.

No one is bound to do what is impossible.

An argument deduced from an impossibility has the greatest validity in law


29-A M.R.S.A. §351 (6). Improper registration either prevents me from obtaining a registration because the vehicle type (automobile) that my Grand Marquis was legally determined to be by the deputy and would (if applicable) require a registration does not apply as no trailer was in combination with my grand marquis. The only registration types that I might be able to use for registration purposes include automobile and combination vehicle. The state does not have any vehicle type defined in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 also existing in chapter 5 that is applicable to my grand marquis. I deny the state requires that my grand marquis, dodge ram, what I tow, or a horse and buggy require registration under 29-A M.R.S.A..

If you do not know the names of things, the knowledge of things themselves perishes.

If you do not know the names of things, the knowledge of things themselves perishes; and, if you lose the names, the distinction of the things is certainly lost.


When no specific requirement exists in law to require registration that non-existent law is incapable of violation. An erroneous understanding of law by law enforcement is irrelevant. Elements required by a law are relevant. No law exists that both allows and requires my Grand Marquis to be registered. Ignorance of the law is no excuse. Claiming a civil violation based on a law that has no relevance to the required legal elements is without excuse.

When public servants such as the director of vehicle services and the secretary of state refuse to properly apply the law as written that places others like myself in legal jeopardy I was put in a position where I had to either violate the law to appear to be within the law or to follow the law while appearing to violate the law which unfortunately invited unwanted law enforcement attention and interaction.

The truth of the description removes the error of the name.

Although I feel the idea of displaying a registration horizontally meaning flat is stupid my feelings about the law are irrelevant. I am not at liberty to ignore or violate a law just because I do not like or respect it. I displayed my registration plates as horizontally as possible based on my respect for the letter of the law after that knowledge was imparted to me as a shocking; but mandatory, legal requirement by 29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1).

Words are interpreted more strongly against the party who puts them forward; words are most readily accepted against the one putting them forward.

29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1) Position of registration plate. A registration plate must be displayed horizontally.

Random House unabridged dictionary 2nd edition 1993 page 921 (found at the law library)
horizontal adj. 1. at right angles to the vertical; parallel to level ground 2. flat or level

https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dicti ... horizontal 3-28-2017 Collins English Dictionary
Horizontal Something that is horizontal is flat and level with the ground, rather than at an angle to it.

I am shocked at how few people actually display their registration plates in accordance with this statute. Almost everyone in Maine uses an improper vertical display by placing registration plates in an upright vertical position on bumpers. I displayed registration plates horizontally on the dash and package tray. The flat method of display I used was as horizontal as possible based on my deepest solicitude and respect for the requirement existing in Maine statute.

After the legislature apparently decided that registration plates must be easily viewed by aircraft and red light cameras placed up high on poles for enforcement purposes they informed the people of Maine of that choice in 29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1).
I deny that horizontal excludes a flat display on a dash or package tray. I deny that registration plate view was required for anything but aircraft and elevated positions per statute. I deny that a horizontal position of registration plates is sensible. I deny I violated statute. A guilty claim by this court for 29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1) will show a federal court that unusable statutes did not provide clear and effective communications accommodating my ADA recognized learning disabilities as required by 28 CFR §35.

Ignorance of fact is excused but not ignorance of law.

A wrong is not presumed.

That interpretation is to be received that is free from fault.

When the words and the mind agree, there is no room for interpretation.

A custom, even if it is of great authority, is never prejudicial to plain truth.


I was placed in the untenable position of violating 29-A M.R.S.A. §351 (6). Improper registration by claiming or allowing to be claimed for me the Maine legislature defined “automobile” for the vehicle type on a registration. The only available registration types included automobile & combination vehicle. 29-A M.R.S.A. §501 (1) and §101 (7), (15-A), (86), (88), and (90) read together provide the legal definitions that must be met to have an automobile. The required legal definitions can not apply unless a trailer hitch is installed with a trailer attached. No trailer can be in combination without a trailer hitch and ball. I deny my grand marquis has an installed trailer hitch.

29-A M.R.S.A. §351 (6) Improper registration. For purposes of this subsection, "not properly registered" means the vehicle is either registered in a manner that is not reflective of its current actual use or as a type of vehicle that it is not as a matter of law, including, but not limited to, a motor vehicle registered as an antique auto when the vehicle is not an antique auto as defined in section 101, subsection 3.
In law every definition is dangerous.

29-A M.R.S.A. §501 (1) . Automobiles; pickup trucks. The fee for an automobile, a pickup truck registered for 6,000 pounds or less or a sport utility vehicle used for the conveyance of passengers or interchangeably for passengers or property is $35.
An automobile... used for the conveyance of passengers or property is a "combination" vehicle.

Words referred to are considered as if incorporated.

29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (15-A) Combination vehicle. "Combination vehicle" means a motor vehicle consisting of a truck or truck tractor in combination with one or more trailers or semitrailers.

Words are to be so understood that the matter may have effect rather than fail.

The only use requirements that mandate registration also change an automobile into a combination vehicle. When I do not have a trailer being drawn by my grand marquis it is not an automobile as defined in law. My grand marquis does not have a trailer hitch installed and was not in combination with 1 or more trailers or semitrailers. If the above statutes are not telling me what is plainly written as part of a legal vehicle definition then federal A.D.A. law has been violated.

The meaning of words is the spirit of the law.

Whenever there is no ambiguity in the words, then no exposition contrary to the words is to be made.


If my machine is designed for guests with the necessary implication of offering hospitality instead of for passengers with the necessary implication of paying a fare it is not an automobile. Without a trailer attached I do not have a combination vehicle. If my machine is not designed to carry property it is not a combination vehicle. If I do not use my machine primarily or over 50% of the time to carry property it is not a combination vehicle. If my machine is not used exclusively 100% of the time to draw other vehicles and is also not constructed to carry a load I do not have a combination vehicle. If it does not meet all the requirements shown above I do not have a combination vehicle per statutory definitions. If my Grand Marquis is not a combination vehicle it can not by statutory definitions be considered an automobile. The charge declares my Grand Marquis to be an automobile. If not the charge is without foundation.

Wilson v. Workman, 192 F. Supp. 852 - Dist. Court, D. Delaware 1961; In addition, to interpret the statute so as to bring the defendant within its reach violates the ordinary usage of "guest". This term as customarily understood connotes a relationship between persons in which one, the guest, receives some measure of hospitality from another, the host.

Riggs v. Roberts, 264 P. 2d 698 - Idaho: Supreme Court 1953
The courts have quite uniformly held that merely paying for gas and oil or sharing the payment for gas and oil is not of itself and alone sufficient to establish passenger status. Elliott v. Behner, 146 Kan. 827, 73 P.2d 1116; Whitechat v. Guyette, 19 Cal.2d 428, 122 P.2d 47.
The authorities likewise are quite uniform to the effect that to constitute one a passenger, not a guest, while the consideration need not be payment of money, there must be contributed by the passenger to the driver of the car something substantial and of worth to the driver, i. e., commercial, not mere courtesy. Albrecht v. Safeway Stores, 159 Or. 331, 80 P.2d 62. This payment or consideration may be made by the passenger or someone else. In other words, the driver must be actuated by a benefit of substantial value, not mere courtesy or kindness or recognition of the amenities or friendship, regardless of whether the one riding in the car or someone else pays or contributes this consideration, to make the rider a passenger. Melcher v. Adams, 174 Or. 75, 146 P.2d 354; Fuller v. Tucker, 4 Wash.2d 426, 103 P.2d 1086; Eubanks v. Kielsmeier, 171 Wash. 484, 18 P.2d 48; Elliott v. Behner, 146 Kan. 827, 73 P.2d 1116, supra; Ausich v. Frank, 70 Idaho 494, 222 P.2d 1073, supra.
Furthermore, the authorities indicate there must be a mutual understanding, reasonably clear to both the rider and the driver before the trip is undertaken, that the rider's relationship to the driver is that of a passenger and not a mere guest. Sprenger v. Braker, 71 Ohio App. 349, 49 N.E.2d 958.

Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 US 106 - Supreme Court 1949
Rights usual to passengers may be denied to the nonpaying guest in an automobile to limit vexatious litigation.

CASEY EX REL. CASEY v. Cuff, 133 A. 2d 659 - NJ: Appellate Div. 1957
"An automobile guest is a person who rides in the automobile of another, without conferring any benefit on him other than the pleasure of his company."
In Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.), there is this definition of the word guest:
"A person entertained in one's house or at one's table; a visitor entertained without pay; hence a person to whom the hospitality of a home, club, etc. is extended."
And in Funk and Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary, we find the following primary definition of guest:
"A person received and entertained at the house of another; a visitor; as a welcome guest. The term is applied with little respect to the duration of the call or visit and whether the person be present by invitation or not * * *."


The Casey v Cuff case above has explained very clearly that passengers and guests in or out of automobiles are not the same. A passenger pays for the privilege while a guest does not. A guest has hospitality extended without charge while a passenger must pay. I deny I charge for the use of my grand marquis. I deny its use or design is for passengers.

An argument based on a subdivision of the subject is most powerful in law.

As I deny my Grand Marquis was designed for passengers the plaintiff must prove that claim. See exhibit Ford. Ford explains that as my grand marquis if not certified for livery purposes is not designed for passengers. It therefore according to Ford Motor Company can not legally be considered to be an automobile under Maine law.

The truth of the description removes the error of the name.

When the words and the mind agree, there is no room for interpretation.


Black's Law Dictionary (9th & 10th ed. ).Passenger: No definition provided.

Things that have had a fixed interpretation are to be altered as little as possible.

Black's Law Dictionary 1280 (4th ed. 1968). PASSENGER. A person whom a common carrier has contracted to carry from one place to another, and has, in the course of the performance of that contract, received under his care either upon the means of conveyance, or at the point of departure of that means of conveyance. Bricker v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 132 Pa. 1, 18 A. 983, 19 Am.St. Rep. 585; Schepers v. Union Depot R. Co., 126 Mo. 665, 29 S.W. 712; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Price, 96 Pa. 256; The Main v. Williams, 14 S.Ct. 486, 152 U.S. 122, 38 L.Ed. 381; Horne v. Southern Ry. Co., 186 S.C. 525, 197 S.E. 31, 35, 116 A.L.R. 745.

PASSENGER One carried for hire, or reward, as distinguished from a "guest" who is one carried gratuitously, that is, without any financial return except such slight benefit as is customary as part of the ordinary courtesy of the road. Duncan v. Hutchinson, 139 Ohio St. 185, 39 N.E.2d 140, 142h
Words ought not to be accepted to import a false description when they are consistent with a true definition.

Black's Law Dictionary 835 (4th ed. 1968). GUEST. A "guest" in an automobile is one who takes ride in automobile driven by another person, merely for his own pleasure or on his own business, and without making any return or conferring any benefit on automobile driver. Elliott v. Camper, 8 W.W.Harr. 504, 194 A. 130, 133; Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law and Prac., Perm. Ed., § 2291.

Black's Law Dictionary 269 (4th ed. 1968). CARRIER: Common carriers are those that hold themselves out or undertake to carry persons or goods of all persons indifferently, or of all who choose to employ it, Merchants Parcel Delivery v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission. 150 Pa.Super. 120, 28 A.2d 340, 344; Burnett v. Riter, Tex.Civ. App., 276 S.W. 347, 349; or those whose occupation or business is transportation of persons or things for hire or reward, In re Rodgers, Neb., 279 N.W. 800, 803, 804. Common carriers of passengers are those that undertake to carry all persons indifferently who may apply for passage, so long as there is room, and there is no legal excuse for refusal. Lazor v. Banas, 114 Pa.Super. 425, 174 A. 817, 819; Anderson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 100 Misc. 411, 166 N.Y.S. 640, 642. Private carriers are those who transport or undertake to transport in a particular instance for hire or reward. Allen v. Sackrider, 37 N.Y. 341; Columbus-Cincinnati Trucking Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 141 Ohio St. 228, 47 N.E.2d 623; 625. 626.

BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW RAWLE'S REVISION 1914 page 553
COMMON CARRIERS. One whose business, occupation, or regular calling it is to carry chattels for all persons who may choose to employ and remunerate him. Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 50, 11 Am. Dec. 133 ; Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 353, 46 Am. Dec. 393; Schoul. Bailm. § 345; Naugatuck 'R. Co. v. Button Co., 24 Conn. 479.
The definition includes carriers by land and water. They are, on the one hand, stagecoach and omnibus proprietors, railroad and street railway companies: Spellman v. Transit Co., 36 Neb. S90, 55 N. W. 270, 20 L. R. A. 316, 38 Am. St. Rep. 7.

BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW RAWLE'S REVISION 1914 page 2509
Passenger. One who has taken a place in a public conveyance, by virtue of a contract, for the purpose of being transported from one place to another, on the payment of fare or its equivalent Bricker v. R.Co., 132 Pa. 1, Atl. 983, 19 Am. St. Rep. 585.

A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNION WITH REFERENCES TO THE CIVIL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF FORIEGN LAW by John Bouvier 1839 page 231 (and stated again in)
A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNION WITH REFERENCES TO THE CIVIL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF FORIEGN LAW by John Bouvier 1843 page 282

PASSENGER, cont. One who has taken a place in a public conveyance, for the purpose of being transported from one place to another. For his rights and duties, vide Common Carriers.

From the words of the law there is to be no departure.

Can I have an “automobile” when the designe is for its owner and guests instead of passengers? The Supreme Court has recently declared that people on board something that moved were not passengers as shown in the Lozman case below.

LOZMAN v. CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA 11-626 U.S. Supreme Court 2013
“Transportation” involves the “conveyance (of things or persons) from one place to another.” And we must apply this definition in a “practical,” not a “theoretical,” way.
When it moved, it carried, not passengers or cargo, but at the very most (giving the benefit of any factual ambiguity to the City) only its own furnishings, its owner’s personal effects, and personnel present to assure the home’s safety.

The denial of a conclusion is error in law.

The definition of “automobile” requires an automobile to be designed for commercial use on the roads. That means engaging in transportation to carry paying passengers possibly as a taxi cab. I deny my Grand Marquis was designed for passengers. The plaintiff must prove that mandated design element. If the statute in requiring “passenger” for a design element does not include the same definition that “passenger” meant in law for well over a century as shown above then the statute is void for vagueness and violates the ADA requirements of clear and effective communications from which I could have benefited. To remain on a public way does not mean moving on a public way as “remain” means stationary.

So the law is written.

29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (7) Automobile. "Automobile" means a motor vehicle designed for the conveyance of passengers.

Fraud lies hidden in general expressions.

Black's Law Dictionary 402-403 (4th ed. 1968).
CONVEY. To pass or transmit the title to property from one to another; to transfer property or the title to property by deed or instrument under seal. Used popularly in sense of "assign," "sale," or "transfer." Crookshanks v. Ransbarger, 80 W.Va. 21, 92 S.E. 78, 82; McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn.App. 434, 134 S.W.2d 197, 205.

Convey relates properly to the disposition of real property, not to personal. Dickerman v. Abrahams, 21 Barb., N.Y., 551, 561. To convey real estate is, by an appropriate instrument, to transfer the legal title to it from the present owner to another. Abendroth v. Greenwich, 29 Conn. 356.

CONVEYANCE. In pleading. Introduction or inducement. In real property law. In the strict legal sense, a transfer of legal title to land. In the popular sense, and as generally used by lawyers, it denotes any transfer of title, legal or equitable Chupco v. Chapman, 76 Okl. 201, 170 P. 259, 266. The transfer of the title of land from one person or class of persons to another. Klein v. McNamara, 54 Miss. 105; Alexander v. State, 28 Tex. App. 186, 12 S.W. 595; In re Loes' Will, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 723, 726. An instrument in writing under seal, (anciently termed an "assurance,") by which some estate or interest in lands is transferred from one person to another; such as a deed, mortgage, etc. 2 Bl. Comm. 293, 295, 309.

Conveyance includes every instrument in writing by which any estate or interest in real estate is created, aliened, mortgaged, or assigned, or by which the title to any real estate may be affected in law or equity, except last wills and testaments, leases for a term not exceeding three years, and executory contracts for the sale or purchase of lands. Stearns Lighting & Power Co. v. Central Trust Co., C.C.A.Mich., 223 F. 962, 966; Shraiberg v. Hanson, 138 Minn. 80, 163 N.W. 1032, 1033.

General
Absolute or conditional conveyance. An absolute conveyance is one by which the right or property in a thing is transferred, free of any condition or qualification, by which it might be defeated or changed; as an ordinary deed of lands, in contradistinction to a mortgage, which is a conditional conveyance. Burrill; Falconer v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 69 N.Y. 491; Brown v. United States, C.C.A.Pa., 95 Fed.2d 487, 489.

Fraudulent conveyance. See Fraudulent.
Mesne conveyance. An intermediate conveyance; one occupying an intermediate position in a chain of title between the first grantee and the present holder.

Primary conveyances. Those by means whereof the benefit or estate is created or first arises; as distinguished from those whereby it may be enlarged, restrained, transferred, or extinguished. The term includes feoffment, gift, grant, lease,exchange, and partition, and is opposed to deriva-
tive conveyances, such as release, surrender, confirmation, etc. 2 Bl. Comm. 309.

Secondary conveyances. The name given to that class of conveyances which presuppose some
other conveyance precedent, and only serve to enlarge, confirm, alter, restrain, restore, or transfer
the interest granted by such original conveyance. 2 Bl. Comm. 324. Otherwise termed "derivative
conveyances" (q. v.).

Voluntary conveyance. A conveyance without valuable consideration; such as a deed or settlement in favor of a wife or children. Gentry v.Field, 143 Mo. 399, 45 S.W. 286; Shannon v. Duffield, 218 Ky. 770, 292 S.W. 322, 323; English v. Brown, D.C.N.J., 219 F. 248, 256.

Even statutes that exist solely to offer definitions for vehicle types must follow due process requirements.


Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 US 156 - Supreme Court 1972; This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute, and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. [Citations omitted]
Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that "[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids."

I deny I was informed that my machines require registration according to Maine statutes. I deny an applicable non-commercial registration requirement exists in statute. Being out of compliance with a law that does not exist is impossible.

The presumption is always in favor of the one who denies.

The ADA requires clear and effective communications (including “and” meaning all available options as opposed to “or” meaning one of the possible options) from Maine to people with learning disabilities. I am unable to perceive any sense of the statute that my machine must meet the definition of truck or truck tractor. I have no idea which one I should choose. As only 1 vehicle type can apply it must be my choice which of the 2 vehicle types to choose. This choice allows me to claim the vehicle type that I choose to change an automobile into a combination vehicle. If the state produces evidence that proves which vehicle type is applicable I could not make the decision of which vehicle type was to be applied.

I deny my grand marquis was legally an automobile at the time of the traffic stop in 2017. I deny my grand marquis was designed and used to meet the following statutory requirements: The conveyance of passengers. designed and used primarily to carry property, designed and used exclusively to draw other vehicles while also not being constructed to carry a load thus not being usable to carry property, and was in combination with one or more trailers.

I deny having an automobile and deny that I can legally register my machine as an automobile or otherwise under Maine statute and registration policy. The plaintiff has the burden of proof for each and every element required by the legal definitions applicable to this case to show those elements exist and apply to both my machinery and me.

I ask the Court to explain how a machine can exist that applies the complete legal definition of a 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (7), (15-A), (66 or 86), (88), (90) & §501 (1) automobile while applying “use” requirements without having a trailer hitch and a trailer in tow.

The automobile registration “use” requirement instantly transforms an automobile into a combination vehicle which adds a completely different legal definition and requirement to that of an automobile. What evidence exists that proves I am a person as so defined?

I deny being a person as defined in 29-A M.R.S.A. 101 (54) as I do not believe I could be any other legal or commercial entity as would be required by the use of "any other". Maine Constitution Article 1 Section 3. Religious freedom & the 1st amendment do not allow denial of my belief that I could NOT be such a person because I am a Christian. Ever since I invited Jesus into my heart he lives there. I am a dual entity not an individual. When I became a Christian I cast off the old man and became a new spiritual being, a new creature in Christ. The old nature, the old man, and the natural person were transformed and changed into a new spiritual being. Were I to blaspheme the holy spirit Jesus would leave me. This means Jesus and I are divisible. This denial is based on my strongly held religious belief which makes inapplicable every part of the legal requirements to be a person as defined in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101. Black's Law Dictionary 843 (9th ed. 2009) defines individual as “ 1. Existing as an indivisible entity. 2. Of or relating to a single person or thing, as opposed to a group.”

29-A M.R.S.A. §501 (1)The fee for an automobile, a pickup truck registered for 6,000 pounds or less or a sport utility vehicle used for the conveyance of passengers or interchangeably for passengers or property is $35.

An automobile or sport utility vehicle used for the conveyance of passengers or property is a combination vehicle and may be issued a special plate with the word "combination" instead of "Vacationland."

29-A M.R.S.A. §101 definitions that are applicable to the charge of having an automobile follow.

7.Automobile. "Automobile" means a motor vehicle designed for the conveyance of passengers

15-A Combination vehicle. "Combination vehicle" means a motor vehicle consisting of a truck or truck tractor in combination with one or more trailers or semitrailers.

54. Person. "Person" means an individual, corporation, firm, partnership, joint venture, association, fiduciary, trust, estate or any other legal or commercial entity.

66. Semitrailer. "Semitrailer" means a vehicle: A. Without motive power; B. Designed for being drawn by a motor vehicle; and C. Designed so that some part of its weight and its load rests upon or is carried by that motor vehicle.

86.Trailer. "Trailer" means a vehicle without motive power, designed to carry persons or property and to be drawn by a motor vehicle

88.Truck. "Truck" means a motor vehicle designed and used primarily to carry property. A truck may be used to tow trailers or semitrailers.

90. Truck tractor. "Truck tractor" means a motor vehicle designed and used exclusively to draw other vehicles and not constructed to carry a load other than a part of the weight of the vehicle and the load drawn.

92. Way. "Way" means the entire width between boundary lines of a road, highway, parkway, street or bridge used for vehicular traffic, whether public or private.

If a road can be used not only by vehicular traffic but also is open for use by those more vulnerable users including but not limited to those who walk or use horses that is not a way as defined in law. I deny that any way can therefore exist in law excepting perhaps the interstate highway system. The interstate highway system prohibits every method of travel except for vehicular traffic. If the interstate highway system actually meets the legal definition of a public way including but not limited to the ownership requirements I believe that the interstate alone would be a Maine defined public way.

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 US 914 - Supreme Court 2000
When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning. Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 484-485 (1987) ("It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term"); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S., at 392-393, n. 10 ("As a rule, `a definition which declares what a term "means" . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated' "); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490, 502 (1945); Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 294 U. S. 87, 95-96 (1935) (Cardozo, J.); see also 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.07, p. 152, and n. 10 (5th ed. 1992) (collecting cases). That is to say, the statute, read "as a whole...leads the reader to a definition.

No guilt attaches to a person who is compelled to obey.

To meet any legal definition my Grand Marquis would have to be within Maine's legal definition of “vehicle”. I could not register my Grand Marquis as a vehicle because it does not meet the legal definition found in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (91) as interpreted by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in Burkitt, Inc. v. CHAMPION RD. MACHINERY, 763 A. 2d 106 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2000 when viewed through the lens provided by Hunt v. Drielick, 852 NW 2d 562 - Mich: Supreme Court 2014 (found in words and phrases) while applying the word the Maine Supreme Judicial Court declared was the defining characteristic of a vehicle “convey” from Black's law 4th edition.

Burkitt, Inc. v. CHAMPION RD. MACHINERY, 763 A. 2d 106 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2000. which as stated defines a motor vehicle...required to be registered under Title 29-A, chapter 5 [29-A M.R.S.A. § 351 et seq.]. Title 29-A, in which "vehicle" is defined as follows:

"Vehicle" means a device for conveyance of persons or property on a way. "Vehicle" does not include conveyances propelled or drawn by human power or used exclusively on tracks or snowmobiles...29-A M.R.S.A. § 101(91) Thus, people or property.

Although I deny the word “passengers” includes all people and note that Title 29-A only applies to “persons” not to “people” the Court did state the defining characteristic of a vehicle using the commercial term “convey”.

Hunt v. Drielick, 852 NW 2d 562 - Mich: Supreme Court 2014 (found in words and phrases)
Clause states that there is no coverage under the policy "while a covered `auto' is used to carry property
Further, "use" is defined as "`to employ for some purpose; put into service...defining "employ" as "[t]o engage in the services of; to put to work".
Finally, "carry" is defined as "1. To bear or convey from one place to another; transport.. Applying these definitions, the clause makes clear ...is engaged in conveying property from one place to another
In order to give the phrase "carry property" meaning, we conclude that the clause was intended to more narrowly preclude coverage during the time that the semi-tractor is physically carrying attached property
It follows that the parties intended the phrase "carry property" to mean just that — coverage can only be precluded during the time that the semi-tractor is used to actually transport property
Accordingly, our interpretation of the first clause does not disregard the phrase "is used" but, rather, appreciates the intended meaning of that phrase and the phrase "carry property."
If the parties had intended...whether property was actually attached...there would have been no need to include the phrase “carry property”.
Applying these definitions, the clause makes clear that there is no coverage when the accident occurs during the time that the semi-tractor is engaged in conveying property from one place to another in any business.

If the state had NOT intended to include towing trailers as a requirement why is it in the automobile definition?

Black's Law Dictionary 402 (4th ed. 1968).
CONVEY. To pass or transmit the title to property from one to another; to transfer property or the title to property by deed or instrument under seal. Used popularly in sense of "assign," "sale," or "transfer." Crookshanks v. Ransbarger, 80 W.Va. 21, 92 S.E. 78, 82; McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn.App. 434, 134 S.W.2d 197, 205. Convey relates properly to the disposition of real property, not to personal. Dickerman v. Abrahams, 21 Barb., N.Y., 551, 561. To convey real estate is, by an appropriate instrument, to transfer the legal title to it from the present owner to another. Abendroth v. Greenwich, 29 Conn. 356.
 
I deny my grand marquis is used to legally convey anyone or anything. That requires commercial use which does not apply to private use as household goods.

The word “convey” denotes commercial use excluding personal property, private or personal use for a “vehicle” in 29-A.
Although I fail to understand how I could have violated these statutes if the Court disagrees with my understanding of the law I claim the defense of necessity and invoke the rule of lenity based on vagueness.

US v. LEBREAULT-FELIZ, Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit 2015
The...defense of necessity requires proof that the defendant "(1) was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil, (2) acted to prevent imminent harm, (3) reasonably anticipated a direct causal relationship between his acts and the harm to be averted, and (4) had no legal alternative but to violate the law."


Had I improperly registered my Grand Marquis as an automobile 29-A M.R.S.A. §2103 (1) clearly states that improper registration would have been a Class E crime as vehicle type is a material fact. People have been convicted for registering a vehicle as the wrong type. In addition to that potential legal punishment 29-A M.R.S.A. §2103 (5 E) instantly changes a traffic infraction for a burned out taillight into a Class D crime. If I happen to have a “deadly weapon” in my possession that further upgrades a traffic infraction into a Class C crime. The material statement of fact on an application form or (as implied in law) on the completed registration of “automobile” as vehicle type could result in 5 years of my life being spent in prison, make me a federal felon, and remove my right to own firearms forever. That exceptionally harsh punishment involving incarceration and heavy fines was far to much punishment for me to risk making an improper and illegal statement of vehicle type or to accept an improper vehicle type on a completed registration certificate.

A person may be capable and incapable at different times.

The A.D.A. including but not limited to 28 CFR §35.130, §35.150, §35.160, and §35.164 requires the legislature to ensure that I am provided clear and effective communications from which I can benefit when they write and publish a statute. Language must not be confusing or vague. Definitions not provided by a statute must be comparable to the definitions that I know and use. Statutes may not utilize special or legal definitions that arise outside of the definitions chapter when they are not the same as normal definitions I know and use if they will provide effective communications.

Davis v. Wechsler, 263 US 22 - Supreme Court 1923; “the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice.”

This case brings federal law and federal requirements with it. I assert my federal rights. Title II of the A.D.A. which includes 28 CFR §35 must be applied. Title II of the A.D.A. requires clear and effective communications. It requires that I also obtain a benefit. When viewed in its entirety a statute must be readily usable and accessible to me. Pay particular attention to 28 CFR §35.130, §35.150, and §35.160. If I was and am unable to read, understand, and properly apply a statute taking my certified learning disabilities into consideration my federal A.D.A. right to obtain clear and effective communications from which a benefit must be obtained could be violated.

The A.D.A. requires clear communications as does basic jurisprudence. I have to be given fair notice clearly stating what is forbidden or required by any statute.

Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 US 156 - Supreme Court 1972; This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617, and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242.

Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that "[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453. The poor among us, the minorities, the average house-holder are not alerted to the regulatory schemes and we assume they would have no understanding of their meaning and impact if they read them.

A direction by a legislature to the police to arrest all "suspicious" persons would not pass constitutional muster. (end case quotes)

If law enforcement officers are required by the legislature to stop everyone that has registration plates displayed horizontally; the position currently required by law, that directive would not pass constitutional muster.

The Court recognized in 1972 that legalese, vague, and confusing language in statutes, Court rules, and other documents must be applied by the Court while assuming that I do not and can not understand their meaning and impact being unlikely to know the intended meaning. The A.D.A. also requires consideration for those with learning disabilities that we may utilize statutes as they are written.

Ballentine's Law Dictionary 1087 (3rd ed. 1969)
Remain. To stay in a place. To be left after others or things have departed or been taken away.

What is the law involved that I was supposed to have violated? I deny this applies to me or my machines. The plaintiff must prove otherwise. “Remains on a public way” must be read to mean abandoned on a public way per Ballentine's definition. To be left after others have departed can not be understood to mean moving along or waiting at a red light or stop sign. That requirement can only be read to not allow permanently abandoning a vehicle on a way. If some other meaning is intended I did not get clear and effective communications from the state as required by federal ADA law.

I deny my grand marquis's use of any public way is prohibited or restricted by law. I deny the lack of authorized access to use a public way. The plaintiff must prove otherwise. Being on a public way is legal unless restricted by law and the restriction is proven to apply..

Everything that the law does not forbid is permitted.


29-A M.R.S.A. §102. Public way use authorized; Any vehicle may be operated on a public way unless prohibited or restricted by this Title, by special law or municipal ordinance, or by rule of the department.

When any essential part has been removed, the whole is removed (or destroyed).


29-A M.R.S.A. §351. Registration required
The owner of a vehicle that is operated or remains on a public way is responsible for registering the vehicle.
1.Failure to register. A person who operates a vehicle that is not registered in accordance with this Title, fails to register a vehicle or permits a vehicle that is not registered to remain on a public way

1-A. Residents required to register. An owner of a vehicle who becomes a resident of this State shall register that vehicle in this State within 30 days of establishing residency.

A presumption yields to the truth.


I have wanted to leave Maine for many years. I deny establishing residency. I hate being cold to much to want to establish residency where the furnace runs 9 months out of 12. Finances alone have prevented me from leaving Maine. Being stuck in a location because leaving for the place I want to live is not yet financially possible does not make me a resident of Maine.

The state has to prove every element involved in the charge. This includes person as defined in 29-A 101-54, public way as defined in §101-59, vehicle as defined in §101-91 and the Burkitt case of 2000 while applying the legal definition of “convey”, and to prove that a vehicle type determined in the charge as an automobile as defined in §101-7, 15-a, 88, and 90 as found in §101 that also requires registration from chapter 5.

Cookson v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 34 A. 3d 1156 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2012
the type of vehicle that is usually subject to registration requires a closer examination of the motor vehicle statute
The statute explicitly qualifies the registration requirements for all vehicles by providing that only a "vehicle that is operated or remains on a public way" must be registered.
because pickup trucks are tantamount to passenger cars; both are presumed to be driven on public ways (end case quote)

All presumptions are in favor of life, liberty, and innocence.


I am to be presumed innocent of every single one of the elements and parts involved in any charge claimed against me. Presuming that my machine is a pickup truck or automobile as defined in statute and required by law must be proven. Presuming that my machine was driven on a public way violates my right to be considered innocent until proven guilty. Does a public way exist in Maine as legally defined? I deny a public way exists. The plaintiff has to prove a public way does exist as defined in law which includes proving all ownership claims necessary.

It is unjust for freeborn individuals not to have the free disposal of their own property.

A person who exercises his own rights injures no one.


29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (59) Public way. "Public way" means a way, owned and maintained by the State, a county or a municipality, over which the general public has a right to pass.


The law is the rule of right; and whatever is contrary to the rule of right is an injury.

The statute recognizes my right to pass on a way but then attempts to remove that right thus injuring me and removing some of my unalienable liberty. This statute has clarified the issues and requirements relating to a public way that must be proven.
1. The public has the right to pass over a public way. A right can not be licensed or have a fee connected to its use.
2. The public is declared to be separate entities from the governmental entities or they would not have been mentioned separately. It is to obvious to require declaration that the government would never need to proclaim in a statute that it has the right to use its own property.
3. To exist as a public way the government must have total and complete; not partial ownership of the way. No other ownership can exist or be proclaimed for a public way to exist.
4. The government must maintain the ways. With many roads (or ways) in Maine being in various states of disrepair have the ways truly been maintained by the government? I think not!
Is the claim of ownership by a governmental entity as required to have a public way proper and true? Who has true ownership of the ways? If the ways do not belong to the government then no public way can legally exist in Maine. No motor vehicle violation would then be possible to commit.

§101- 92.Way. "Way" means the entire width between boundary lines of a road, highway, parkway, street or bridge used for vehicular traffic, whether public or private.

Laws should bind their own author.

Does the government actually own the way or does it merely have a right of way allowing use of that width?

Packard v. Banton, 264 US 140 - Supreme Court 1924
The streets belong to the public and are primarily for the use of the public in the ordinary way. Their use for the purposes of gain is special and extraordinary and, generally at least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems proper.

Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 US 106 - Supreme Court 1949
The streets belong to the public and are primarily for the use of the public in the ordinary way. Their use for the purposes of gain is special and extraordinary and, generally at least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems proper. Certainly the presence or absence of hire has been the hook by which much highway regulation has been supported.

City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 US 750 - Supreme Court 1988
The streets belong to the public and are primarily for the use of the public in the ordinary way.
I deny the claimed ownership of the streets also referred to as “ways” is legally correct. The Supreme Court of the U.S.A. has declared the government is not the sole owner of the streets which means no legally defined public way exists in Maine.

City of Rockland v. Johnson, 267 A. 2d 382 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1970
In Burr v. Stevens, supra,( Burr v. Stevens, 90 Me. 500 - 1897 ) the Court said:
"The owner of land over which a highway is laid retains his right in the soil for all purposes which are consistent with the full enjoyment of the easement acquired by the public. This right of the owner may grow less and less as the public needs increase. But at all times he retains all that is not needed for public uses, subject, however, to municipal or police regulations."

Sleeper v. Loring, 83 A. 3d 769 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2013; A right-of-way is legally defined as a legal right to pass through property owned by another. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1326 (7th ed. 1999).


The land owner owns the width between the boundary lines of a way. The government has obtained a right of access otherwise known as a right of way over that land as opposed to total legal ownership of that property. Although the land a way is on may be regulated, the title for that way remains with the landowner. Once again, the Court has declared the ways do not belong to a governmental entity but rather declared that a way belongs to others.
There are enough Court decisions above to tell me the streets belong not to governmental entities but instead belong to the public. The government was never given complete and true ownership of the streets. Instead it was only given the authority and requirement by the people of Maine to perform maintenance and to provide upkeep for those streets owned by we the people of Maine.

I deny the public surrendered their ownership of the streets. I deny ownership of the streets and the absolute right to use the streets in any reasonable manner was ever surrendered to the government. I deny the state paid the public to buy the streets the public owns. Therefore I deny the state, county, or municipality own the streets.

I deny the streets are not owned by the public as tenants in common. I deny that each one of the people of Maine does not own a share of the streets. The government has only the authority it has received from the people. There is no authority in any one of the people to charge other people to access the streets, If one of the people alone lacks the authority to charge to use the streets for private use then the approximately 1.3 million people of Maine when combined together can not possess that authority either and thus are unable to pass such authority to the state.

All power is inherent in the people. The word People refers to one or many. As one of the people of Maine I deny that I do not possess all power within myself. I deny that sovereign immunity can be denied regarding my legal status based on my status as a free white man per the Maine & USA Constitutions and supreme court precedent.

Maine Constitution Preamble
. We the people of Maine, in order to establish justice, insure tranquility, provide for our mutual defense, promote our common welfare, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of liberty, acknowledging with grateful hearts the goodness of the Sovereign Ruler of the Universe in affording us an opportunity, so favorable to the design; and, imploring God's aid and direction in its accomplishment, do agree to form ourselves into a free and independent State, by the style and title of the State of Maine and do ordain and establish the following Constitution for the government of the same.
Ownership of the roads was not expressly transferred or given to the State by the preamble or in any other part of the Constitution of the State of Maine. Blocking access to the roads unless the government is paid an access fee is removing our liberty which the Constitution preamble expressly says must be provided. The state does not respect or acknowledge the public's ownership rights.

No one can be forced to pay access fees to enter and use what they have even partial ownership of barring a contract signed by all partners with ownership rights. Without the required ownership by a governmental entity no public way can legally exist in Maine as shown by the 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (59) declaration of ownership.

I know not if the current status of statutory requirements was done on purpose because the legislature recognizes the people are sovereign and can not be regulated in their private capacity without their permission or if this is a result of modifying statutes over time. Regardless of how the law came to be written this way the law is crystal clear. The law put forth in Title 29-A does not apply to me or my machines.

The practice of adding and annulling laws is a most dangerous one.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US 218 - Supreme Court 1973
That which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex and mysterious.
To preserve the fairness of the trial process the Court established an appropriately heavy burden on the Government before waiver could be found—"an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
As Mr. Justice Harlan once wrote: "The sound reason why [the right to counsel] is so freely extended for a criminal trial is the severe injustice risked by confronting an untrained defendant with a range of technical points of law, evidence, and tactics familiar to the prosecutor but not to himself.

I do not receive communications as effectively as BAR members do from Maine statutes. That potentially ineffective communication would violate my A.D.A. rights. My learning disabilities require simple and concise communications. Statutes use the language of the Court a language which is incompatible with the language I normally use as the definitions are very different. I find such communications incomprehensible without interpretation into plain language. Despite having looked up some legal definitions I can not be expected or required to act as my own interpreter. I can not be expected to hire a lawyer at my expense for the sole purpose of having that lawyer act as an interpreter to help me understand the confusing and incomprehensible communications presented by the State of Maine in its written communications which may include statutes and rules of Court.

28 CFR § 35.160 General.
(a) (1) A public entity shall take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, members of the public, and companions with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.
(b) (1) A public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford qualified individuals with disabilities, including applicants, participants, companions, and members of the public, an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity of a public entity.
(2) The type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure effective communication will vary in accordance with the method of communication used by the individual; the nature, length, and complexity of the communication involved; and the context in which the communication is taking place. In determining what types of auxiliary aids and services are necessary, a public entity shall give primary consideration to the requests of individuals with disabilities. In order to be effective, auxiliary aids and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in such a way as to protect the privacy and independence of the individual with a disability.
(c) (1) A public entity shall not require an individual with a disability to bring another individual to interpret for him or her.
(2) A public entity shall not rely on an adult accompanying an individual with a disability to interpret or facilitate communication except— (i) In an emergency involving an imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public where there is no interpreter available; or (ii) Where the individual with a disability specifically requests that the accompanying adult interpret or facilitate communication, the accompanying adult agrees to provide such assistance, and reliance on that adult for such assistance is appropriate under the circumstances.

If 29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1) does not mean horizontal which means reaching out to the horizon and includes flat then I did not receive clear and effective communications. I would point out that used car dealers often place their registration plates mounted on magnets flat on the trunk lid of a car without attracting police attention. Should I be treated differently?

If the plain meaning of the text as I am able to understand it was not presented in the language of the common man and is not so applied we are not only without the rule of law but we have also encountered a violation of the A.D.A..

Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 US 511 - Supreme Court 1993
Respondents do not dispute the plain meaning of this text. Rather, they argue that when §525 is read in the context of the entire statute, it implicitly... They make three points in support of this argument: that the history of the Act reveals an intent...; that other provisions of the Act are expressly conditioned on a showing of prejudice; and that a literal interpretation produces illogical and absurd results. Neither separately nor in combination do these points justify a departure from the unambiguous statutory text.

Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment.
The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators. As the Court said in 1844: "The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself . . . ." Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 9, 24 (emphasis added). But not the least of the defects of legislative history is its indeterminacy. If one were to search for an interpretive technique that, on the whole, was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more promising candidate than legislative history. And the present case nicely proves that point.
Judge Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends.
That is not merely a waste of research time and ink; it is a false and disruptive lesson in the law. It says to the bar that even an "unambiguous [and] unequivocal" statute can never be dispositive; that, presumably under penalty of malpractice liability, the oracles of legislative history, far into the dimmy past, must always be consulted. This undermines the clarity of law, and condemns litigants (who, unlike us, must pay for it out of their own pockets) to subsidizing historical research by lawyers.

One of the problems with legislative history is that it is inherently open ended. In this case, for example, one could go back further in time to examine the Civil War-era relief Acts.


In order to obtain a registration certificate requires a payment of an excise tax and a registration fee is required. The registration requirement as shown in statute therefore results in a taxing statute.

United States v. Merriam, 263 US 179 - Supreme Court 1923; in statutes levying taxes the literal meaning of the words employed is most important, for such statutes are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. If the words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the Government and in favor of the taxpayer. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153.
if there be admissible in any statute, what is called an equitable construction, certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute, where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute.

Federal Constitutional & A.D.A. rights based on my learning disabilities are not to be frustrated or ignored.

State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1973
even if the State Court's recent interpretation be consistent with the basic spirit of the law of the State and the State Court is clearly acting in good faith and with intellectual honesty—if the law of the State uses concepts arbitrarily, or assigns to them significance contrary to standards of meaning properly cognizable as normative, a federal tribunal may reject the State Court's interpretation when acceptance of it will frustrate federal constitutional protections.

Luria v. United States, 231 US 9 - Supreme Court 1913
Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty of protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other. Under our Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native citizen in all respects, save that of eligibility to the Presidency. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 165; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 101; Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 827.

If the political society decides that it does not owe me a duty of protection then I have no duty of allegiance to it. If I have no duty of allegiance to that society I have no duty to obey that society or any of its rules. I must be compensated for my allegiance. If I do not receive a complete offer of protection within reasonable bounds then the contract is broken. I am thererby free of that obligation due to lack of compensation. The question to be looked at is simple. Does society truly protect me or does it say it has no duty to protect me when it has that ability? The Supreme Court in Castle rock says the community has no duty to protect me. That statement denying protection released me from any obligation to a community.

Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 US 748 - Supreme Court 2005
Respondent claims the benefit of this provision on the ground that she had a property interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her husband; and that the town deprived her of this property without due process by having a policy that tolerated nonenforcement of restraining orders.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, we left a similar question unanswered in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U. S. 189 (1989), another case with "undeniably tragic" facts: Local child-protection officials had failed to protect a young boy from beatings by his father that left him severely brain damaged. Id., at 191-193. We held that the so-called "substantive" component of the Due Process Clause does not "requir[e] the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors." Id., at 195. We noted, however, that the petitioner had not properly preserved the argument that—and we thus "decline[d] to consider" whether—state "child protection statutes gave [him] an `entitlement' to receive protective services in accordance with the terms of the statute, an entitlement which would enjoy due process protection." Id., at 195, n. 2.
The procedural component of the Due Process Clause does not protect everything that might be described as a "benefit": "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire" and "more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."

Our cases recognize that a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.
Resolution of the federal issue begins, however, with a determination of what it is that state law provides. In the context of the present case, the central state-law question is whether Colorado law gave respondent a right to police enforcement of the restraining order.
The critical language in the restraining order came not from any part of the order itself (which was signed by the state-court trial judge and directed to the restrained party, respondent's husband), but from the preprinted notice to law-enforcement personnel that appeared on the back of the order

"(a) Whenever a restraining order is issued, the protected person shall be provided with a copy of such order. A peace officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order.
"(b) A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person when the peace officer has information amounting to probable cause that:
"(I) The restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of a restraining order; and
"(II) The restrained person has been properly served with a copy of the restraining order or the restrained person has received actual notice of the existence and substance of such order.
"(c) In making the probable cause determination described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (3), a peace officer shall assume that the information received from the registry is accurate. A peace officer shall enforce a valid restraining order whether or not there is a record of the restraining order in the registry." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.5(3) (Lexis 1999) (emphases added).

We do not believe that these provisions of Colorado law truly made enforcement of restraining orders mandatory.
The serving of public rather than private ends is the normal course of the criminal law because criminal acts, "besides the injury [they do] to individuals, . . . strike at the very being of society; which cannot possibly subsist, where actions of this sort are suffered to escape with impunity." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 5 (1769)

Perhaps most radically, the alleged property interest here arises incidentally, not out of some new species of government benefit or service, but out of a function that government actors have always performed—to wit, arresting people who they have probable cause to believe have committed a criminal offense.[13]
The indirect nature of a benefit was fatal to the due process claim of the nursing-home residents in O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U. S. 773 (1980).
We conclude, therefore, that respondent did not, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, have a property interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her husband.
In light of today's decision and that in DeShaney, the benefit that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its "substantive" manifestations
The Supreme Court in Castle Rock has outright declared the government has no duty to protect the individual. Society only protects the public because that protection prevents injury that would otherwise strike at and injure the same society itself which chooses only to protect itself not the individual.
The duty of protection agreed to obviously excludes protection of and for the individual. The public at large which apparently means the society itself has a duty of allegiance to the society which it already is. The individual has no duty of allegiance to or need to obey that society as they can not expect to receive needed protection from that society as compensation. Compensation must be given to the individual for the contract with society to be in force.
Luria v. United States showed the existence of an unenumerated individual (as compared to a collective) right to protection from the government society that is required in return for government allegiance by each individual. (end case quotes)


The government society speaking through the Supreme Court in Luria v. United States, 231 US 9 - Supreme Court 1913 explained the nature of the reciprocal arrangement between the one man, woman, or child and the society. The same Supreme Court in Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 US 748 - Supreme Court 2005 showed us that essential contract requirements it recognizes as mandatory have been violated. Mandatory membership in a political society was removed when the Supreme Court in Castle Rock declared the contract had been destroyed. No government society mandatory membership requirement has existed since at least 2005. I do not choose to opt into that society.

The right of protection as compensation for allegiance is a 9th amendment and a Me. Const. Art. 1 section 24 right which has been violated. Whereas this right has been violated the State has violated its corporate charter and ceased to exist after it chose to commit suicide by this action.
The State of Maine has also chosen to violate the right to trial by jury for all civil suits as required. By removing this protection clearly mandated by Maine's constitution and required for traffic infractions the state removed its protection of my rights from me. No state can expect allegiance or obedience after removing its guarantee of mandatory protection of my rights as compensation for that allegiance

The state must prove jurisdiction. What evidence exists to prove beyond any that the statutes and Constitution of Maine apply to me just because of my physical location? Although writing on paper may claim to have jurisdiction what proof exists proving that claim is legitimate? I can write on paper claiming to have jurisdiction and control over every judge but would that foolish statement being written down make it true? Jurisdiction must be proven. It can not be assumed or presumed. To assume that a written document from a time before I was born applies to me is illogical unless proof of that applicability exists.

I ask how less than 18,000 white men who voted for the Constitution of Maine to be approved as a Government to control persons as part of the Missouri compromise can bind 1.3 million people today. When the vote was taken approximately 77,000 men and 75,000 women age 16 and over were in Maine per the census. When less than 18,000 free men voted to bind themselves and less than 8,000 voted against becoming a state in 1820 when approximately 298,000 people lived here how can it be said the people agreed? Less than 1/6 of those of age voted. How does that choice by others apply to me almost 200 years later? What evidence exists to prove future generations including the 1.3 million now living here can be bound, enslaved, or controlled based solely on the written will of less than 18,000 men dead for more than a century after the 13th amendment was passed? When a man dies every unmet obligation he had for a contract died with him. His left over obligations can not be required to be honored by their descendants except for what can be paid from the remaining estate of the dead man.

I deny that generational debts or obligations can exist as a matter of law. I deny that debt or obligation can be passed from the dead to the living.
The State of Maine also committed suicide by stepping outside its corporate charter requires and thus ceased to exist based on the USA constitution probably in the 1960's. When Maine became a state as part of the Missouri compromise it was immediately inducted into the United States of America and that U.S.A. Constitution and its requirements were added to those in Maine's Constitution. Among those requirements we find

Constitution of the United States

Article 1 Section 10
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.


The State of Maine has violated that federal Constitutional duty by paying its debts with federal reserve notes without silver or gold backing them. Maine does not pay its debts with actual gold or silver coin or a means that has a ready conversion to such coins. The State of Maine has violated its corporate charters. It has ceased to exist as a matter of law as a result of violating specified sections of its corporate charters. A corporation that has violated its founding charter no longer exists in law. A corporation that has ceased to exist can not be injured or make any claim against any man.

Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs of Everglades Drainage Dist., 258 US 338 - Supreme Court 1922

To say that the legislature simply was establishing the situation as both parties knew from the beginning it ought to be would be putting something of a gloss upon the facts. We must assume that the plaintiff went through the canal relying upon its legal rights and it is not to be deprived of them because the Legislature forgot.

29-A M.R.S.A. §102. Public way use authorized; Any vehicle may be operated on a public way unless prohibited or restricted by this Title, by special law or municipal ordinance, or by rule of the department.

The state must declare in a limiting statute where all other limitations exist if use is otherwise restricted. Clear and effective communications require an express statement referencing all limitations and where the sections where they may be found . I can not be expected to be a legal scholar and to search every word ever printed to find some limitation that may not exist. I do not have 20 years to search through all possible restrictions that could exist literally anywhere. This lack of reference ignores the clear and effective communications that I require to receive a benefit per 28 CFR §35.130, §35.150, & §35.160.
I depended on my rights to use the streets that I have ownership rights in as I am part of the public. If the legislature forgot to include requirements limiting access to the streets for my Grand Marquis, Dodge Ram, & trailers my rights control. No registration is due under Maine statute. Bringing me to Court, claiming that I have a duty which does not exist, and then attempting to convince a judge that I must pay what I do not owe is nothing short of criminal extortion by State of Maine.

Extortion is a crime when, by color of office, any person extorts what is not due, or more than due, or before the time when it is due.
I am a free white Man. I stand in that capacity recognized by the supreme court in 1793 and 1854. I am one of the people of Maine. I deny I am a “person” or have a “persona” as a term of civil law. The plaintiff must prove that I am a person as defined in statute and as used in Maine's constitution.

"Man" is a term of nature; "person" (persona), a term of civil law.

I finish this case with one final thought for the Court to consider. Long ago men far wiser than I put forth the following maxim of law: If you depart from the law, you will wander (without a guide), and everything will be in a state of uncertainty to everyone.

The ignorance of the judge is the misfortune of the innocent.


If a judge ignores the legal requirements and illegally determine an automobile is not as defined and avoids the literal registration requirements that are shown clearly in this case will any law ever be understandable by anyone or will everything in law end up in a perpetual state of uncertainty and confusion? A.D.A. law is on the next 2 pages.

When the foundation has been removed (or demolished), the structure collapses.


"Facilities" is not specifically defined within the ADA.

Black's law dictionary 591 (6th ed. 1990) Facilities. That which promotes the ease of any action, operation, transaction, or course of conduct. The term normally denotes inanimate means rather than human agencies, though it may also include animate beings such as persons, people and groups thereof. Cheney v. Tolliver, 234 Ark. 973, 356 S.W.2d 636, 638."

When the people working at the Court refuse to explain the rules of Court and Court procedure they violate this ADA requirement. Clerks calling an ADA request to understand the rules of Court and trial procedure and steps that a man with a mental impairment will soon be under as asking for "legal advice" does not change the ADA's requirements regarding accommodation and use of the facilities. If the clerk does not have the knowledge required to complete this type of reasonable request they are then responsible to find another person who can impart that knowledge to me even if that requires getting a guard, lawyer, district attorney, or a judge that can explain the rules of Court and the steps a trial goes through.



28 CFR § 35.130 General prohibitions against discrimination (a) No qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public entity.
(b) (1) A public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not, directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the basis of disability— (i) Deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service;
(ii) Afford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others;
(vii) Otherwise limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid, benefit, or service.
(2) A public entity may not deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in services, programs, or activities that are not separate or different, despite the existence of permissibly separate or different programs or activities.
(7) (i) A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.
(d) A public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.
§ 35.150 Existing facilities
(a) General. A public entity shall operate each service, program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.
§ 35.160 General.
(a) (1) A public entity shall take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, members of the public, and companions with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.
(b) (1) A public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford qualified individuals with disabilities, including applicants, participants, companions, and members of the public, an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity of a public entity.
(2) The type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure effective communication will vary in accordance with the method of communication used by the individual; the nature, length, and complexity of the communication involved; and the context in which the communication is taking place. In determining what types of auxiliary aids and services are necessary, a public entity shall give primary consideration to the requests of individuals with disabilities. In order to be effective, auxiliary aids and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in such a way as to protect the privacy and independence of the individual with a disability.
(c) (1) A public entity shall not require an individual with a disability to bring another individual to interpret for him or her.
(2) A public entity shall not rely on an adult accompanying an individual with a disability to interpret or facilitate communication except— (i) In an emergency involving an imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public where there is no interpreter available; or
(ii) Where the individual with a disability specifically requests that the accompanying adult interpret or facilitate communication, the accompanying adult agrees to provide such assistance, and reliance on that adult for such assistance is appropriate under the circumstances.
§ 35.164 Duties
This subpart does not require a public entity to take any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens. In those circumstances where personnel of the public entity believe that the proposed action would fundamentally alter the service, program, or activity or would result in undue financial and administrative burdens, a public entity has the burden of proving that compliance with this subpart would result in such alteration or burdens. The decision that compliance would result in such alteration or burdens must be made by the head of the public entity or his or her designee after considering all resources available for use in the funding and operation of the service, program, or activity and must be accompanied by a written statement of the reasons for reaching that conclusion. If an action required to comply with this subpart would result in such an alteration or such burdens, a public entity shall take any other action that would not result in such an alteration or such burdens but would nevertheless ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, individuals with disabilities receive the benefits or services provided by the public entity.

State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1973
even if the State Court's recent interpretation be consistent with the basic spirit of the law of the State and the State Court is clearly acting in good faith and with intellectual honesty—if the law of the State uses concepts arbitrarily, or assigns to them significance contrary to standards of meaning properly cognizable as normative, a federal tribunal may reject the State Court's interpretation when acceptance of it will frustrate federal constitutional protections.

The same logic applies to federal A.D.A. rights and protections as to the rights mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.
There is a reason that LEO has a new meaning: Legally Entitled to Oppress. Thanks to Bob Livingston for this one.

Williams v. United States, 341 US 97 - Supreme Court 1951
It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court.

Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 US 54 - Supreme Court 1795
Judges may die, and courts be at an end; but justice still lives, and, though she may sleep for a while, will eventually awake, and must be satisfied
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Re: My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Postby country_hick » Fri Apr 14, 2017 10:57 pm

After the officer has testified. The following questions are what will be asked in cross examination

(Part 1 are you an honest cop?)

(Officer) Have you ever been in a trial before? When was your first trial?

At your prior trials did you swear or affirm to tell the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Was there a time limit given for your oath to tell the truth or was it given without a stated timeframe or conditions? Without any exceptions being stated in that oath the oath was and is an unconditional lifetime oath requiring 100% honesty at all times forever without any exceptions just like the oath given when joining the military is a lifetime oath.

Since the time you first took that oath have you said anything that was not 100% truth and the entire truth without leaving anything out for any reason including being nice, polite, or considerate or during an interrogation or for any other reason?

2 possible response to the answer from the above question.
1 Do you really expect this court to believe you have not fudged the facts to be nice and did not use strategic deception during any investigation you have been involved in after your first trial ended? (or)
2. You admit you have lied. As you have admitted that you committed perjury why should any of your testimony be accepted as you have admitted you are a liar who violated your solemn oath?

If you were not 100% honest or lied to anyone at any time after your first trial how would that action not have been perjury based on that lifetime oath of telling the truth?

(Part 2 do you know the law?)

Do you know and understand the law you said I violated? (perjury trap)

If you understand and know the law you can tell this court what the law says and means.

§452. Manner of display . 1. Position of registration plate. A registration plate must be displayed horizontally.

Do you know the difference between horizontal and vertical? What does vertical mean? What is the difference between horizontal and vertical?

If I lay something flat on the ground is that horizontal? Is flat included within the meaning of the word horizontal?

Did I have registration plates? Was the painted side of the registration plate on top or on the back side unable to be seen?

Was my registration plate displayed in a vertical position? No? It must have been missing or horizontal. Were the registration plates missing?

If you stopped me for being within the laws requirements then all other charges must be fruit of the poisonous tree. They were made only after you stopped me for having a horizontal display per law.

What evidence supported by statute do you have to prove that non-commercial use of the streets by my grand marquis requires registration?

What evidence do you have to prove my grand marquis requires registration?

(29-A 501 (1) would be the only possible but incorrect reply)

What is a vehicle? What is a public way? What is a way? What is a person? Where is each one of those terms defined?

29-A M.R.S.A. 101 (59), (92), (54).


(Part 3 where is your evidence?)

What evidence do you have to prove that I have a vehicle, automobile, am a person, or a public way exists and was involved as defined in Maine statute and case law?

The paper I was given said my machine type was 4 door. Where is 4 door defined and requiring registration per title 29-A? (No 4 door definition exists.)

Was a trailer being towed by my grand marquis when I was stopped? (No.)

How many statutes are required to prove that I have an automobile as defined by Maine statute? (6 statutes total shown 3 lines later.)

Did my grand marquis have a trailer hitch installed when you stopped me? (No.)

Where is automobile, truck, truck tractor, combination vehicle, semi-trailer, and trailer defined?

29-A M.R.S.A 501 (1) 101 (7), (66), (86), (88), (15-A), and (90).

What is a combination vehicle? What is a truck? What is a truck tractor? What is a trailer? What is a semi-trailer? What is an automobile?

Can you prove my grand marquis is a combination vehicle, truck, truck tractor, had a trailer, was designed for passengers, carries passengers, carries property, or requires registration?
(The deputy will be thinking something like...I wasn't taught this or the definitions...HELP!)


(Part 4 where is the claimant?)

I now call the plaintiff, the claimant, State of Maine to the stand.

If state of Maine did not appear then the plaintiff has surrendered this claim by not following the forum of the thing in dispute. No representative can answer questions asked directly of the plaintiff.

How did I injure you? What was that injury? Why do you deserve to have me pay you for damages?

Why do you claim I owed you any duty? How did I obtain that obligation? Where is your signed complaint? Are you claiming injuries to yourself or to others? How can a legal fiction be injured? Did I tear or rip your corporate papers?

When State of Maine has violated its corporate charter by not applying its constitution exactly as it was voted on by the people of Maine in 1820 how can you claim not to be outside your corporate charter authority? When a corporation steps outside its corporate charter does it cease to legally exist?
There is a reason that LEO has a new meaning: Legally Entitled to Oppress. Thanks to Bob Livingston for this one.

Williams v. United States, 341 US 97 - Supreme Court 1951
It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court.

Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 US 54 - Supreme Court 1795
Judges may die, and courts be at an end; but justice still lives, and, though she may sleep for a while, will eventually awake, and must be satisfied
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Re: My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Postby country_hick » Tue Apr 18, 2017 10:23 pm

The case (yet to have a court date assigned) has just been seriously damaged for the prosecution by the Maine supreme judicial court. In the appeal regarding my dodge rams registration I was told my claim that I did not require registration based on section 351 was "without merit"...end of analysis and statement... I have a new charge on the same statutes. I presented a motion. I asked to have the MSJC explain what I did not understand so I could say I understood the charge in the new case. The court said it took my A.D.A. requests as a request to reopen the case. I asked for clear and effective communications from which I could benefit. Apparently the court would not understand the A.D.A. if it was read in front of them by its authors.

Now when asked at trial If I understand the charge against me I get to say "No sir. I do not understand the charge. The Maine supreme judicial court told me I do not understand 351 but did not let me know what I do not understand about it. Under the principle of stare decisis this court must accept that I do not understand this charge and I am unable to understand what I do not understand about it because I was not told what I do not understand about it sir."
There is a reason that LEO has a new meaning: Legally Entitled to Oppress. Thanks to Bob Livingston for this one.

Williams v. United States, 341 US 97 - Supreme Court 1951
It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court.

Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 US 54 - Supreme Court 1795
Judges may die, and courts be at an end; but justice still lives, and, though she may sleep for a while, will eventually awake, and must be satisfied
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Re: My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Postby country_hick » Wed May 24, 2017 8:33 pm

The case is to be heard tomorrow the 25th.

I have more than 130 questions for the deputy who wrote the ticket.

My defense took 28 pages to print out. I will read every word into the record.

I have a few surprises waiting...
There is a reason that LEO has a new meaning: Legally Entitled to Oppress. Thanks to Bob Livingston for this one.

Williams v. United States, 341 US 97 - Supreme Court 1951
It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court.

Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 US 54 - Supreme Court 1795
Judges may die, and courts be at an end; but justice still lives, and, though she may sleep for a while, will eventually awake, and must be satisfied
User avatar
country_hick
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Posts: 814
Joined: Thu Feb 04, 2016 2:19 am
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Re: My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Postby country_hick » Wed May 31, 2017 9:13 pm

I won at trial by proving the required elements of the charges were not proven but I was found guilty anyway.
I was never asked if I was guilty or not.
I was never asked if I understood the charges.
I was stopped before I could get through 1/2 of my defense. The traffic ticket trial was stopped by the judge at only 3 hours.
I am not sure if I even had a genuine trial.

I went through the list of elements. During cross-examination I asked...

Do you know how many statutes are involved? (no) there are 20.
Do you know how many elements are implicated in the charges? (no) There are 45.


Did you provide evidence at trial today that proved... (one at a time elements 1-45 inclusive).

The prosecutor objected for relevance. I quoted the statutes involved. My questions were good, approved, and got answers.
I do not think even 1 element actually was proven with any evidence introduced at trial. It did not matter. I was found guilty because I was in Court.

20 Statutes and 2 adjudicated definitions are involved for an automobile 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (7), (15-A), (42), (48), (50), (54), (55), (59), (61), (62), (66), (75), (86), (88), (90), (91), (92),,and §501 (1) paragraph 2 sentence 1 or the adjudicated definition of “vehicle“ as found in Burkitt, Inc. v. CHAMPION RD. MACHINERY. 29-A M.R.S.A. §351 (1) and 29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1) for improper display.
12 Statutes for a pickup truck 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (42), (48), (50), (54), (55), (59), (60-A), (61), (62), (75), (88), and §501 (1)
What statutes must never be violated when registering any vehicle? 29-A M.R.S.A. §351 (6) and 29-A M.R.S.A. §2103.

Elements required to be proven at trial.

(If a pickup truck)
1 with a registered weight
2 a current registration certificate with a current registered weight.
3 no current registration
4 used primarily to carry property

(If an automobile)
1 used for conveyance of passengers or property.
2 designed for passengers (not guests)
3 designed as a conveyance
4 a truck or truck tractor.
5 in combination with one or more trailers or semitrailers.
6 without motive power
7 designed primarily to carry property
8 used primarily to carry property or
8 designed exclusively to draw other vehicles
10 used exclusively to draw other vehicles but not constructed to carry a load.
11 used for (only) vehicular traffic.
12 an owner.
13.vehicle
14. operated or remains
15. public way
16. way
17. owned by the state, county, or municipality
18. public has a right to pass
19. prohibited or restricted by this title
20. owned by the state county or municipality
21. the public has the right to pass
22 conveyance of persons or property on a way
23 displayed horizontally (not vertically)
24 front and the rear
25 must always be horizontal.
26 visible and legible when horizontal from an unstated position but obviously higher than the plates
27violation of any provision of this Title, or of any rules established under this Title
28 individual
29 drives or in control of a vehicle
30 holding title or having exclusive use
31 person as defined in 101 (54)
32 registration is required by title 29-A.
33 registration which includes registration of a vehicle
34 person
35 established residency in this State or has been domiciled in this State
36 Without motive power
37 Designed for being drawn by a motor vehicle;
38 designed so that some part of its weight and its load rests upon or is carried by that motor vehicle OR so constructed that no part of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle
39 operated or remains on a public way
40 not registered in accordance with this Title
41 fails to register a vehicle
42 not registered to remain on a public way
43 registration not displayed horizontally.
44 not properly displayed.
45 not visible and legible

The charging instrument was defective. It did not list the necessary elements to be proven and did not even list the vehicle type I was supposed to have had.

(29-A M.R.S.A. §101
(7) Automobile. "Automobile" means a motor vehicle designed for the conveyance of passengers that has a seating capacity of not more than 15 persons, including the operator.
(11) Bus. "Bus" means a motor vehicle designed for carrying more than 15 persons, including the operator.
(15-A) Combination vehicle. "Combination vehicle" means a motor vehicle consisting of a truck or truck tractor in combination with one or more trailers or semitrailers.
(25-A) Golf cart. "Golf cart" means a motor vehicle that is originally designed and manufactured for operation on a golf course for sporting or recreational purposes and that is not capable of exceeding speeds of 20 miles per hour.
(30) Law enforcement officer. "Law enforcement officer" means a person who by virtue of public employment is vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for crimes, whether that duty extends to all crimes or is limited to specific crimes.
(32) Limousine. "Limousine" means a vehicle for hire, with a driver, that is used for the transportation of passengers and that has a seating capacity of at least 5 and no more than 14 persons behind the driver
(32-A) Low-speed vehicle. "Low-speed vehicle" means a 4-wheeled motor vehicle that is able to attain a speed of at least 20 miles per hour but not more than 25 miles per hour and is less than 3,000 pounds in unloaded weight.
(36) Moped. "Moped" means a motorized device designed to travel with only 2 or 3 10-inch or larger diameter wheels in contact with the ground
(38) Motorcycle. "Motorcycle" means a motor vehicle that has a seat or a saddle for the use of the rider and is designed to travel with only 2 or 3 10-inch or larger diameter wheels in ground contact and has a motor with a cylinder capacity of more than 50 cubic centimeters or an electric motor with a capacity of not less than 1,500 watts.
(41-B) Motorized scooter. "Motorized scooter" means a scooter that has 2 or 3 wheels less than 10 inches in diameter in ground contact
(42)42. Motor vehicle. "Motor vehicle" means a self-propelled vehicle not operated exclusively on railroad tracks
(43) Motor vehicle violation. "Motor vehicle violation" means a violation of this Title.
(44) Moving violation. "Moving violation" means a violation of this Title for which points may be assessed in accordance with section 2458, subsection 3.
(47-A) Off-road vehicle. "Off-road vehicle" means a motor vehicle that, because of the vehicle's design and configuration, does not meet the inspection standards of chapter 15 and that is not a moped or motorcycle.
(48) Operator. "Operator" means an individual who drives or is in control of a vehicle or who is exercising control over or steering a towed vehicle.
(50) Owner. "Owner" means a person holding title to a vehicle or having exclusive right to the use of the vehicle for a period of 30 days or more.
(54) Person. "Person" means an individual, corporation, firm, partnership, joint venture, association, fiduciary, trust, estate or any other legal or commercial entity.
(55) Pickup truck. "Pickup truck" means a truck with a registered gross vehicle weight of 10,000 pounds or less.
(59) Public way. "Public way" means a way, owned and maintained by the State, a county or a municipality, over which the general public has a right to pass.
(60-A) Registered weight. "Registered weight" means the gross vehicle weight specified on the vehicle's registration certificate.
(61) Registration. "Registration" means the registration certificate, plates and renewal devices pertaining to the registration of a vehicle, including temporary registered gross weight increases
(62) Resident. "Resident" means a person who has declared or established residency in this State or has been domiciled in this State for a period of at least 30 days
(66)Semitrailer. "Semitrailer" means a vehicle: A. Without motive power B. Designed for being drawn by a motor vehicle; and C. Designed so that some part of its weight and its load rests upon or is carried by that motor vehicle.
(70-A) Sport utility vehicle. "Sport utility vehicle" means a motor vehicle constructed on a light truck chassis but designed primarily for the transportation of persons or any motor vehicle designated by the United States Department of Transportation as a sport utility vehicle.
(75) Street or highway. "Street" or "highway" means a public way.
(82) Tractor. "Tractor" means a motor vehicle used primarily off the highway for farming, forestry or other similar types of activities.
(85) Traffic infraction. "Traffic infraction" means any violation of any provision of this Title, or of any rules established under this Title, not expressly defined as a crime or as a civil violation and otherwise not punishable by incarceration.
(86) Trailer. "Trailer" means a vehicle without motive power, designed to carry persons or property and to be drawn by a motor vehicle, not operated on railroad tracks, and so constructed that no part of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle. "Trailer" does not include tow dollies.
(88) 88. Truck. "Truck" means a motor vehicle designed and used primarily to carry property. A truck may be used to tow trailers or semitrailers.
(90) Truck tractor. "Truck tractor" means a motor vehicle designed and used exclusively to draw other vehicles and not constructed to carry a load other than a part of the weight of the vehicle and the load drawn.
(91) Vehicle. "Vehicle" means a device for conveyance of persons or property on a way.
(92) Way. "Way" means the entire width between boundary lines of a road, highway, parkway, street or bridge used for vehicular traffic, whether public or private.

§351 The owner of a vehicle that is operated or remains on a public way is responsible for registering the vehicle.
(1) Failure to register. A person who operates a vehicle that is not registered in accordance with this Title, fails to register a vehicle or permits a vehicle that is not registered to remain on a public way commits:
A. A traffic infraction for which a fine of not more than $50 may be adjudged if the vehicle was registered and the registration has been expired for more than 30 days but less than 150 days;

§351 (6)Improper registration. A traffic infraction for which a fine of not less than $200 nor more than $1,000 may be adjudged if the vehicle is not properly registered. For purposes of this subsection, "not properly registered" means the vehicle is either registered in a manner that is not reflective of its current actual use or as a type of vehicle that it is not as a matter of law, including, but not limited to, a motor vehicle registered as an antique auto when the vehicle is not an antique auto as defined in section 101, subsection 3.

§452
(1) Position of registration plate. A registration plate must be displayed horizontally. Only one set of Maine registration plates may be displayed on one vehicle. A registration plate must be attached to the front and the rear of each vehicle except as follows A trailer and semitrailer registration plate may be attached only to the rear of that trailer or semitrailer. B. A motorcycle registration plate may not be attached to the front of that motorcycle. C. A manufacturer, dealer or transporter registration plate may be attached only to the rear of the vehicle. D. A truck tractor registration plate may be attached only to the front of that truck tractor.

(3) Proper display. Registration plates must always be properly displayed.

(4) Plainly visible and legible. Registration plates, including the numbers, letters and words, must always be plainly visible and legible.

§501 (1)Automobiles; pickup trucks. The fee for an automobile, a pickup truck registered for 6,000 pounds or less or a sport utility vehicle used for the conveyance of passengers or interchangeably for passengers or property is $35. The fee for a pickup truck registered for more than 6,000 pounds but no more than 10,000 pounds is $37.

An automobile or sport utility vehicle used for the conveyance of passengers or property is a "combination" vehicle and may be issued a special plate with the word "combination" instead of "Vacationland."
There is a reason that LEO has a new meaning: Legally Entitled to Oppress. Thanks to Bob Livingston for this one.

Williams v. United States, 341 US 97 - Supreme Court 1951
It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court.

Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 US 54 - Supreme Court 1795
Judges may die, and courts be at an end; but justice still lives, and, though she may sleep for a while, will eventually awake, and must be satisfied
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Re: My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Postby country_hick » Wed May 31, 2017 9:22 pm

I filed this motion today.

I submit this motion pursuant to M.R.C.P. Rule 59 as a "Request for a NEW TRIAL or AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENTS "regarding traffic infraction #323...

I move the Court to change its judgements of guilty. No evidence was provided that proved I required registration or where the view of a registration plate (which was not proven to be required) must be seen from to allow a finding of guilty based on evidence presented at trial.

Alternatively if the Court will not change its findings of guilt I move the Court to allow me to restart the closing arguments part of the the trial which would finally allow me to present my total and complete defense and my multiple defenses which included jurisdictional questions that I was denied the ability to raise.

I had my defense laid out point by point piece by piece on paper. My prepared defense was to be presented in a very specific order going through one part completely before proceeding to the next part. Why in violation of State v. Buchanan did the Court stop me from providing a complete and total defense which included multiple defenses including a 1st amendment defense, showing the state may have committed perjury at trial by the use of video, and the lack of commencement of ratification, among other issues all of which I was denied the ability to ever introduce along with multiple jurisdictional issues that I was prepared to raise at the end of my multiple defenses?

State v. Buchanan, 921 A. 2d 159 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2007
"[A] defendant is accorded wide latitude to present all evidence relevant to his defense." State v. Garrett, 1998 ME 7, ¶ 5, 704 A.2d 393, 395 (quotation marks omitted). See also McMahan, 2000 ME 200, ¶ 18, 761 A.2d at 55.

State v. Dean, 589 A. 2d 929 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1991
a defendant is accorded wide latitude to present all evidence relevant to his defense. State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167, 172 (Me.1984); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me.1981); State v. Leclair, 425 A.2d 182, 186 (Me.1981).
There is a reason that LEO has a new meaning: Legally Entitled to Oppress. Thanks to Bob Livingston for this one.

Williams v. United States, 341 US 97 - Supreme Court 1951
It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court.

Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 US 54 - Supreme Court 1795
Judges may die, and courts be at an end; but justice still lives, and, though she may sleep for a while, will eventually awake, and must be satisfied
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Re: My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Postby country_hick » Wed May 31, 2017 9:48 pm

I filed this motion today. I had 7 days. This was presented on day #6. The judge probably will hate me but I want answers to the questions below based on events at trial.

I submit this motion pursuant to M.R.C.P. Rule 52 as a "Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law" regarding my rules of court & trial by jury motions plus the actual trial itself regarding traffic infraction #323...

I move the Court to timely and completely answer all 249 queries presented within this FOFCOL typed in a reasonable font size as opposed to harder to read hand writing without pointing to a case decision based on different foundations than the foundation used in my most recent challenges by declaring the right to trial by jury for a traffic infraction was denied or saying the question is without merit. The A.D.A. in 28 CFR section 35 requires clear and effective communications from which I can benefit be provided. Therefore under federal law I need explanations with actual answers. A curt denial such as “without merit” does not provide the clear and effective communications from which I can benefit as required by 28 CFR section 35.

Nulla res vehementius rempublicam continet quam fides. Nothing holds the state more strongly together than honesty.
Sublata veneratione magistratuum respublics ruit. When respect due to magistrates is taken away, the state falls.

I move the Court to provide the actual explanation that explains completely the reasons behind each and every part of each decision and what that decision declares in plain language for appeal purposes.
This trial by jury motion is not the same as my previous trial by jury motion. In this new challenge Maxims of law, the federal equal protection clause, and the federal due process clause were added among other things. The new challenge to the rules of Court invoked maxims of law for the first time. The requirement to treat these as entirely new challenges is shown by the Maxim of law Nullum simile est idem. No similar thing is the same.
Maxims of law were not previously included to be considered as issues in determining the application of Me. Const. Art. I, section 20 in my 2016 challenge to this apparent constitutional violation.

I move the Court to provide direct explanations of how and why the federal and state equal protection and due process clauses along with maxims of law are not to be considered for the right to trial by jury as these issues were raised for the first time in my May 2017 motion.
My 2016 challenge to the rules of Court at only 6 pages without using maxims of law was similar but not the same. The denial of that motion is inapplicable to a proper decision on the new expanded motion based on similar but also different elements.

My 2016 trial by jury challenge was 10 pages long. That prior version lacked maxims of law along with the equal protection and due process clauses from the Constitution of the United States that have been added. The challenges while similar are not the same. The denial of the previous motions foundation is inapplicable to a proper decision that must be based on the new expanded foundation of the new motion.

Pejus est judicio quam per vim injuste facere. It is worse to act in a trial unjustly, than by force.
Ubi factum nullum, ibi forcia nulla. Where there is no fact, there is no strong argument.

1. Are the rules of court written to be treated under the Maine Constitution as reasonable laws, regulations or both per their design and implementation to either defend or benefit or to both defend and benefit the people of this State?
1A If the rules of court are not intended to be a benefit for the people of Maine are they written to be a detriment to the people of Maine?
2. Do the rules of Court regulate the court thus proving the rules of Court are regulations?
3. If the rules of court are not considered laws, rules, or regulations what are they?
4. Under what express Constitutional authority can the legislature hand over its sole power to make and establish all reasonable laws and regulations to the judicial branch considering the barrier found in ME. Const. art. IV section third, the Maxims of Law : Delegata potestas non potest delegari. A delegated authority cannot be again delegated. 2 Co. Inst. 597; 5 Bing. N. C. 310; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1300, and the Maxim of law: Delegatus non potest delegare. A delegate or state cannot appoint another. And the Maxim of Law Enumeratio unius est exclusio alterius. Specification of one thing is an exclusion of the other.?
Verba accipienda sunt cum effectu,--ut sortiantur effectum. Words are to be received with effect that they may have their effect.
5. Where within the Constitution of Maine is the authority for the judicial branch to write it own rules and regulations ONLY after the legislature directly authorizes the Court to be found? Maxim of Law: Ex facto jus oritur. Law arises out of fact; that is, its application must be to facts.
6. How is the Maine constitution different from the U.S.A. constitution regarding which branch is required to write the rules of court?
7. Is preserving the rights of the people of Maine a benefit to the people of Maine provided by the rules of Court?
8. As the legislature can not surrender its solely granted constitutional power to the judiciary how did passing 4 M.R.S.A. ˜8 NOT create a constitutional violation when the legislature redelegated power granted by the people of Maine solely to the legislative branch when that power was then redelegated once more to the judiciary considering the: Maxims of Law: Delegatus non potest delegare. A delegate or state cannot appoint another. Maxim of Law: Delegata potestas non potest delegari. A delegated authority cannot be again delegated. Qui ab alio derivitum jus habet, non alia lege obtinebit ac is unde derivatum est. He who hath a right derived from another, will not obtain it by any other law than he from who it is derived. as each of these Maxims of law does not allow any person to redelegate an already delegated authority?
9. How is it possible for Me. Const. art. III § 2 not to be violated when the judiciary writes rules of court and passes laws based on a statute that was passed in apparent violation of the separation of powers requirement?
10. Does Me. Const. art. IV§ 1 deny the judiciary the ability to pass regulations (on the court) for the benefit of the people known as the rules of court including the rules of civil procedure?
11. Can an unconstitutional transfer of legislative power to the judicial branch for many years remove the constitutions requirements and authority? Ex facto jus oritur. Law arises out of fact; that is, its application must be to facts.
12. How do the rules of court NOT arbitrarily destroy rights of appeal and review." when the rules of Court deny discovery only to certain defendants involved in a suit against one and only one plaintiff alone?
13. Is the constitution supreme over Maine Courts in all ways including the requirement that declares which governmental branch must write court procedures?
14. Does the State of Maine continue to exist when it knowingly operates outside of its corporate charter known as the Constitution by having the wrong governmental branches perform duties belonging to a different branch?
15. Did the Court apply the Maxims of Law shown below that were a new addition to this upgraded challenge to the Rules of Court?
Delegata potestas non potest delegari. A delegated authority cannot be again delegated. 2 Co. Inst. 597; 5 Bing. N. C. 310; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1300.
Ex facto jus oritur. Law arises out of fact; that is, its application must be to facts.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
Enumeratio unius est exclusio alterius. Specification of one thing is an exclusion of the other.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed renders what is implied silent.
Copulatio verborum indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu. Coupling words together shows that they ought to be understood in the same sense.
Maxim: Delegatus non potest delegare. A delegate or state cannot appoint another.
Maxim: Delegata potestas non potest delegari. A delegated authority cannot be again delegated. 2 Co. Inst. 597; 5 Bing. N. C. 310; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1300.
Divinatio non interpretatio est, quae omnino recedit a litera. It is a guess not interpretation which altogether departs from the letter. Bacon’s Max. in Reg. 3, p. 47.
16. Which (if any) of the the above listed Maxims of Law used within the denied motions did the Court choose to violate or ignore?
17. I move the court to declare why it did not respond to the part of the filed trial by jury motion where the requirement of “I move the Court to present the pre-1820 suit that proves trial by jury was denied for traffic infractions or the pre-1820 analogue.” was present.
18. Did the Court take judicial notice when the motion included the requirement of “I move the Court to take judicial notice and judicial cognizance of the practice of the Court to find that there is such a right unless it is affirmatively shown the right did not exist in 1819”?
19. Did the Court take judicial notice as required when the motion included the requirement “ I move the Court to take judicial notice that maxims of law clearly state when the foundation is removed everything built on that foundation is also removed and can not stand.”?
20. I move the Court to declare which foundational elements used to deny trial by jury in 1983 were factually applied by the Court when they determined there was no right to trial by jury for a traffic infraction in State v. Anton and again on April 25 2017.
21. Are those foundational elements still applied to ALL civil suits today or are they only applied to a select few civil suits while other civil suits receive unequal treatment by using different foundational elements to determine their right to trial by jury?
22. I move the Court to declare which foundational elements were factually applied by the In re Shane T., 544 A. 2d 1295 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1988 Court when that Court determined the right to trial by jury.
23. I move the Court to declare whether the foundational elements used to determine State v. Anton and the foundational elements used to determine In re Shane T. are interchangeable with each other?
24. I move the Court to declare whether the foundational elements used to determine State v. Anton and the foundational elements used to determine In re Shane T. are irreconcilable or not and to then explain why they are compatible or incompatible.
25 Did the Court ignore the legal classification of traffic infractions as civil suits as was declared by State v. Anton, 463 A. 2d 703 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1983 when the Court declared "We are concerned here with an entire system for disposition of traffic infractions that requires the District Court judge first to determine a defendant's liability and then either impose a civil fine within prescribed limits or suspend defendant's operator's license, or both....We are aware of no civil suit in 1819 that would have been comparable to such a proceeding." by declaring this was a civil action instead of a civil suit as recognized by the Maine supreme Judicial Court in Anton?
26. I move the Court to provide the Court case from 1819 or earlier that proves traffic infractions or their pre-1820 analogue was denied trial by jury in Massachusetts as required to be proven to deny trial by jury for a civil suit as a traffic infraction is shown to be a civil suit by State v. Anton, 463 A. 2d 703 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1983 when the Court declared "We are aware of no civil suit in 1819 that would have been comparable to such a proceeding." and has been required for 30 years (1987) to have that case denying trial by jury proven to exist as shown by by City of Portland v. DePaolo, 531 A. 2d 669 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1987; In re Shane T., 544 A. 2d 1295 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1988; N. SCH. CONGREGATE HOUSING v. Merrithew, 558 A. 2d 1189 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1989; Smith v. Hawthorne, 2006 ME 19 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2006; and Godin v. Schencks, 629 F. 3d 79 - Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit 2010.
26. I move the Court to provide a constitutionally valid justification that allows the application of 2 incompatible foundations for civil suits not proven to have been denied trial by jury in 1819 when the foundation used in State v. Anton was overturned 4 years later in 1987 by the same Court.
27 What evidence was provided to prove that Me. Const. Art. I, §20 application to various types of civil suits not shown to have been tried by jury in 1820 based on conflicting foundations can be allowed without violating the equal protection clause which denies the ability to apply the Constitution to different litigants by using different standards based solely on the type of civil suit involved?
28 I move the court to explain how allowing the foundation used to determine Anton despite that foundation being directly refuted in City of Portland v. Depaolo does NOT directly violate the Constitution of the United States Amendment XIV Section 1. "nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” and also how this does not also violate Me. Const. Art. 1 Section 6-A. Dig. 50, 17, 29. Quod initio vitiosum est, non potest tractu temporis convalescere. Time cannot render valid an act void in its origin.
For the ease of the Court I have provided the foundations used in several Court cases below in order for the incompatibility to be readily seen..
Whereas the foundation used by State v. Anton, 463 A. 2d 703 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1983 for article I, section 20 of the Maine Constitution.is shown below
"That provision, substantially similar to article 15 of the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts Constitution, preserves the right to jury trial in civil actions where that right existed when the Maine Constitution was adopted. The provision does not apply to suits in equity or other civil proceedings not then tried by jury in the common law courts."
is incompatible with the foundation used by N. SCH. CONGREGATE HOUSING v. Merrithew, 558 A. 2d 1189 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1989
"We have recently modified how we analyze the constitutional right to a jury trial to track more closely the language of article I, section 20. Specifically, our practice now is to find that there is such a right unless it is affirmatively shown that a jury trial was unavailable in such a case in 1820. See In re Shane T., 544 A.2d 1295, 1297 (Me.1988); City of Portland v. DePaolo, 531 A.2d 669, 670 (Me.1987)."
and the foundation used in Anton is also incompatible with foundation used within Godin v. Schencks, 629 F. 3d 79 - Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit 2010
"Maine's constitution itself provides that "[i]n all civil suits, and in all controversies concerning property, the parties shall have a right to a trial by jury, except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced." Me. Const. art. I, § 20. This provision has "historically been construed as guaranteeing the right to a trial by jury in civil cases unless it is demonstrated that such a right did not exist at the time of the adoption of [Maine's] Constitution." Smith v. Hawthorne, 892 A.2d 433, 444 (Me.2006). "
and he foundation used by State v Anton was directly removed as shown by...
City of Portland v. DePaolo, 531 A. 2d 669 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1987
"the parties are entitled to a jury trial even if that type of action was unknown at the time the Maine Constitution was adopted, unless at the time the Maine Constitution was adopted that action or its pre-1820 analogue was not tried to a jury either in the first instance or on an appeal. We today overrule any intimations or statements in our earlier cases that are incompatible with the broad view of the guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases contained in article I, section 20 of the Maine Constitution."
I move the Court to explain how treating different litigants involved in a civil suit who have a type of suit not proven to be denied trial by jury can be denied or granted a trial by jury without the reasoning being arbitrary or capricious.
29. How does the Court NOT violate the federal equal protection clause by applying 2 different foundations to various civil suits one foundation shown in State v. Anton to preserve the right to jury trial in civil actions where that right existed when the Maine Constitution was adopted and If it is of a kind that was heard and determined by a common law court with a right to jury trial prior to the adoption of the Maine Constitution, then article I, section 20, guarantees the right today.for traffic infractions and another for other civil suits such as violating an obscenity ordinance as shown by In re Shane T., 544 A. 2d 1295 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1988; Article I, section 20 guarantees parties in a civil suit the right to a jury trial unless at the time the Maine Constitution was adopted, the same or similar action was not tried to a jury. when determining who has the right to civil trial by jury under Me. Const. Art. 1 § 20?
30 Was The Foundation used to determine State v. Anton overturned as claimed by Godin v. Schencks, 629 F. 3d 79 - Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit 2010, In re Shane T., 544 A. 2d 1295 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1988, N. SCH. CONGREGATE HOUSING v. Merrithew, 558 A. 2d 1189 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1989, Smith v. Hawthorne, 2006 ME 19 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2006, and City of Portland v. DePaolo, 531 A. 2d 669 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1987?
N. SCH. CONGREGATE HOUSING v. Merrithew, 558 A. 2d 1189 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1989; "We have recently modified how we analyze the constitutional right to a jury trial to track more closely the language of article I, section 20. Specifically, our practice now is to find that there is such a right unless it is affirmatively shown that a jury trial was unavailable in such a case in 1820. See In re Shane T., 544 A.2d 1295, 1297 (Me.1988); City of Portland v. DePaolo, 531 A.2d 669, 670 (Me.1987)."
In re Shane T., 544 A. 2d 1295 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1988; Article I, section 20 guarantees parties in a civil suit the right to a jury trial unless at the time the Maine Constitution was adopted, the same or similar action was not tried to a jury.
31. If no Court case can be shown to exist that proves trial by jury was denied in 1820 under what legal theory can State v. Anton which has an overturned foundation as proven by multiple subsequent Court cases be used to deny trial by jury in an unequal manner compared to the foundation used to determine the same right for other civil suits including but not limited to obscenity ordinances not be a direct and complete violation of the federal equal protection clause and the federal due process clause?
32. Was the foundation used to decide State v. Anton overturned or is that foundation still intact meaning it must be used for the foundation to determine the right to trial by jury for ALL civil suits not just a select few types of civil suits? SUBLATO FUNDAMENTO CADIT OPUS. Jenk.. Cent. 106. The foundation being removed, the superstructure falls.
33. Was State v. Anton decided based on a defective foundation that was later removed in City of Portland v. Depaolo or is the foundation used to decide State v. Anton still in effect as applied to ALL civil suits? Quod initio vitioum est non potest tractu temporis convalescere. What is defective in origin cannot be mended by passage of time.
34. How may the same constitutional Me. Const. Art. I, § 20 be applied to different classes of litigants based on the application of 2 different and incompatible foundations to different litigants without violating the federal due process clause?
35. Am I denied the enjoyment of my civil rights also known as privileges and immunities or am I discriminated against in the exercise of those rights when the denial presented to me is not based on the same foundational application of Me. Const. Art. I §20 for my trial by jury right compared to the same trial by jury right for those who violate an obscenity ordinance in direct violation of Me. Const. Art. I §6-A?
36. I need details. I move the Court to explain exactly and precisely what the Court meant by the words “without merit”as used for each separate denial? Does without merit actually mean “The judge is to embarrassed to say you are right” so Judge Greg Campbell says “without merit” instead?
37. A Court has lied about the proper foundation that must be used to apply Me. Const. Art. I, § 20. Did the First Circuit Court of appeals lie by quoting Smith v. Hawthorne with only minor modification when that Court said in Godin v. Schencks, 629 F. 3d 79 - Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit 2010; "Me. Const. art. I, § 20. This provision has "historically been construed as guaranteeing the right to a trial by jury in civil cases unless it is demonstrated that such a right did not exist at the time of the adoption of [Maine's] Constitution” OR did the Maine Supreme Judicial Court lie when they said “Anton is still good law” when Anton was decided based on a foundation that required the party requesting trial by jury to prove the right actually existed as proven by a Court case citation from 1819 or earlier to obtain a civil trial by jury?
37A I move the Court without dissembling to directly DECLARE which Court has LIED about which of the 2 foundations that must be applied to Me. Const. Art. I, § 20 based on the cases mentioned in the previous paragraph. As one of the 2 Courts mentioned has lied in regards to the actual requirements of Me. Const. Art. I §20 that lying Court must be identified and held accountable for perpetrating that damaging lie about Maine’s Constitutional requirements for ALL civil suits.
38. Whereas the Court made the claim in the decision that my latest challenge to the rules of Court was without merit to avoid the necessity of filing a judicial complaint regarding this matter I move the Court to prove that stated claim of “without merit” by showing the mechanism in Maine’s Constitution that allows the legislature to redelegate authority the people had already delegated solely to the legislative branch that allowed the legislative branch alone to the exclusion of all other branches the authority to pass laws and regulations. To prove that claim that my challenge was without merit the Court must now prove the existence of that piece of the puzzle that allows the legislative branch to author and enact a statute delegating legislative authority to the judicial branch without violating the separation of powers doctrine while also avoiding a violation of the maxim of law Delegata potestas non potest delegari. A delegated authority cannot be again delegated.
39. Did the Court violate or take judicial notice of all maxims of law which are our common law heritage used within my trial by jury and rules of Court motions?
40. What evidence did the legislature provide that was used at trial that allowed the Court to determine what was meant by horizontal and if horizontal included flat or vertical within its definition?
41. Does the statute declare from what position a registration plate must be viewed or is the required view vague and ambiguous concerning the viewing position that is required that might appear to be from high in the sky??
42. When I believe that horizontally displayed meant placed flat and the view required was from aircraft how was I given fair warning of what the judge appeared to claim the law demands as fair warning if what is required or not allowed is required by the U.S. Supreme Court?
43. Was the charging instrument defective as it did not list every one of the required elements which would include the proper vehicle type type mentioned in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 or by not being brought forth in the name of the real party of interest who had to be at the trial?
44. List all times and type of problems I had at trial that showed I had a problem understanding any part of how to properly proceed during the trial including but not limited to certain procedural aspects such as knowing the difference between different parts of a trial and what to do at any part of a trial.
45. I move the Court to declare how each element individually was determined to be applicable to this suit by providing directly from the trial transcript or from evidence presented at trial all of the evidence that was offered on the record created during trial that proved the application of each of the following 20 Statutes and 2 adjudicated definitions are involved for an automobile 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (7), (15-A), (42), (48), (50), (54), (55), (59), (61), (62), (66), (75), (86), (88), (90), (91), (92),,and §501 (1) paragraph 2 sentence 1 and the adjudicated definition of “vehicle“ as found in Burkitt, Inc. v. CHAMPION RD. MACHINERY. 29-A M.R.S.A. §351 (1) and 29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1) for improper display proving each of the required elements?
1 used for conveyance of passengers or property.
2 designed for passengers (not guests)
3 designed as a conveyance
4 a truck or truck tractor.
5 in combination with one or more trailers or semitrailers.
6 without motive power
7 designed primarily to carry property
8 used primarily to carry property or
8 designed exclusively to draw other vehicles
10 used exclusively to draw other vehicles but not constructed to carry a load.
11 used for (only) vehicular traffic.
12 an owner.
13.vehicle
14. operated or remains
15. public way
16. way
17. owned by the state, county, or municipality
18. public has a right to pass
19. prohibited or restricted by this title
20. owned by the state county or municipality
21. the public has the right to pass
22 conveyance of persons or property on a way
23 displayed horizontally (not vertically)
24 front and the rear
25 must always be horizontal.
26 visible and legible when horizontal from an unstated position but obviously higher than the plates
27violation of any provision of this Title, or of any rules established or stated under this Title
28 individual
29 drives or in control of a vehicle
30 holding title or having exclusive use
31 person as defined in 101 (54)
32 registration is required by title 29-A.
33 registration which includes registration of a vehicle
34 person
35 established residency in this State or has been domiciled in this State
36 Without motive power
37 Designed for being drawn by a motor vehicle;
38 designed so that some part of its weight and its load rests upon or is carried by that motor vehicle OR so constructed that no part of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle
39 operated or remains on a public way
40 not registered in accordance with this Title
41 fails to register a vehicle
42 not registered to remain on a public way
43 registration not displayed horizontally.
44 not properly displayed.
45 not visible and legible (from an unspecified position which should include viewing from aircraft)

46 Although the prosecutor asked the state questions about a public road he did not ask about a 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (59) public way which is the only type of way required for this case. A public way would likely be a public road but a public road would not necessarily be a public way. The 2 definitions are not exactly the same which means they are different. What evidence was offered to prove a public way existed as a "public road" is not listed in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 definitions, was not involved in the charge, as "public way" is the only proper statutory term required to prove or disprove?
46A Did the Court make the same distinction that I did between a "public road" and a "public way" as a public road is just a road the public can use regardless of ownership or did I receive ineffective communications from the state's prosecutor because he used a phrase differently than he reasonably could have expected me to have understood it?
47. As a “public road” is not defined in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 what difference could a road being a public road make when a “public road” just means any road open to public use which includes roads owned by shopping malls that are exclusively on property owned by private businesses?
48. As regulating or controlling a road and ownership of that same road are not necessarily interchangeable facts as a party can regulate a road without owning the road if that party is given permission to regulate. As an example several states have sold their roads, streets, or highways (with toll booths) to private investors which proves that ownership of a road is not related to signs or designation of route numbers that may be on or applied to that road. How could similarities in some road signage and designations compared to public roads (which may or may not be public ways) signage and designations prove ownership of the road by the state, county, or municipality even though it might strongly suggest and arguably might show who regulates or perhaps controls that road?
49. What evidence proved that I was a 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (54) "Person. "Person" means an individual, corporation, firm, partnership, joint venture, association, fiduciary, trust, estate or any other legal or commercial entity." as the maxim of law Copulatio verborum indicat acceptationem ineodem sensu. The joining of words, shows their acceptation in the same sense. means that an individual must be a legal or commercial entity and therefore would not apply to a living breathing man?
50. After the state claimed that I had a specific vehicle type known as an automobile how did the state prove that claim when the state admitted the state did not prove ANY of the required elements under cross examination?
51. Was the U.S. Supreme Court wrong when it declared 3 times that the streets belong to the public instead of the streets being owned by the government as must be proven to verify the existence of a 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (59) "Public way. "Public way" means a way, owned and maintained by the State, a county or a municipality, over which the general public has a right to pass."?
51A If the Supreme Court was correct in its ownership claim of the public owning the streets how can a 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (59) public way exist as a public way must be owned by the state, county, or municipality and the public is mentioned in a manner that differentiates the public so it is not the same as the state county, or municipality by necessary inference?
52. As I was defending against the proper term "public way" as that is the exact statutory phrase used and I denied a public way exists when I did not react to the separate phrase "public road" because it was the incorrect legal term to use as required by statutory law. Did I receive ineffective communications or was a denied a benefit from the trial when viewed in its entirety because pieces of it were not within my comprehension based on the wrong wording being accepted by the Court but not recognized as valid by myself?
52A Does the Court have some strange idea that a public road means something other than "a road open for public travel" regardless of ownership?
52B If the prosecutors meaning of "public road" was not the same as my meaning did the state prosecutor give me clear and effective communication as required under 28 CFR section 35 when he asked questions about a "public road" as I could not know he and I did not benefit from choosing "public road" to use instead of saying "public way" which is defined in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (59) to which I had already objected?
53. At trial was it proven that State of Maine received an injury?
54. Am I allowed to register my machines in opposition to the legal definitions found in various parts of 29-A M.R.S.A. ?
55. How could the Court determine I had the specific vehicle type known as an automobile when the state never proved that required element?
56. Did the Court recognize that I have a learning disability?
57 Does the Court recognize that within my thinking I am very black and white, not able to see or recognize shades of gray?
58. What effective accommodations were provided to assist me with on ALL of my impaired cognitive functions including a slow processing speed to help me recognize the importance of statements made at trial?
59 Does the Court recognize that I require exact words spoken to understand the concept or idea involved; that using the wrong word means I do not consider those words as applying to the meaning found in even mildly different words?
59A. Does the Court recognize that using different words to refer to the same thing is likely not to mean the same thing to me?
59B Does the Court accept that despite my learning about findings of fact and conclusions of law that I could not find that rule in civil procedure and had to ask the law library where to find that rule because "Findings by the Court" did not suggest to me that "Findings by the Court" had anything to do with "findings of fact" when I read that phrase?
60. Does the Court recognize that I was listening for "public way" to be mentioned during questioning and that "public road" is not a "public way" thus "public road" required no objections as this case only involved a public way instead of a public road?
61. Does the Court recognize that I am exceptionally literal and concrete in my thinking?
62 Does the Court recognize that I do not see inferences?
63 Does the Court recognize that when I read a definition I must apply it literally exactly and precisely as it is written?
63A. Did the Court apply the federal A.D.A. requirements to ensure I received clear and effective communications at all times?
63B. At trial how many times did the court see any signs I was confused about how to apply any Court procedure?
64 Did the Court apply the benefit of any doubt to me as required by Blaney v. Inhabitants of Town of Shapleigh, 455 A. 2d 1381 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1983
When a statute imposing or enforcing a tax or other burden on the citizen is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court will interpret the statute in a light most favorable to the citizen?
65 Was I was found guilty based solely on my understanding of statutes that enforce a burden of displaying registration plates and to obtain registration when I followed the law exactly as it is written precisely as I understood it after I explained what the statutes meant in Court?
66. Did the Court interpret the statutes in the light most favorable to me or did the Court interpret the statutes most in favor of the state against case law requirements?
66A If the statutes were interpreted most in my favor how was I found guilty when I explained at trial what the statutes literally say and how I had acted according to the statutes demands?
67. Does 29-A M.R.S.A. §351 (6) "not properly registered" means the vehicle is... registered ...as a type of vehicle that it is not as a matter of law" allow me to register my machine as an automobile if the legal definition of automobile in §101 (7), (15-A), (66), (86), (88), or (90) and §501 (1) does not apply?
68 What evidence proved that title 29-A did not apply exclusively to commercial users of the road?
69. When horizontal is not defined precisely is that word vague or precise?
70. When "plainly visible and legible" is not given along with any specific viewing angle or position to be viewed from is that language vague or ambiguous?
71. If a registration plate is to be horizontal and horizontal can include "flat" within its meaning how is it unreasonable to think the view required would be from an aircraft overhead or from cameras on poles where a third brake lights would be irrelevant instead of being viewed from ahead or behind as that would require upright & vertical mounting?
72. Did the legislature commit a 28 CFR section 35 violations of the A.D.A. by writing and enacting statutes that did not give me clear and effective communications; that did not provide me with a benefit, that were not usable by me because the intended meaning was inaccessible to me when the statutes communications are viewed in their entirety based on my learning disabilities as appears to be proven by the Courts guilty proclamation?
72A what foundation did you base the decision in #72 upon?
73. How does the Court claim not to violate the holding from Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 US 511 - Supreme Court 1993
"Respondents do not dispute the plain meaning of this text. Rather, they argue that when §525 is read in the context of the entire statute, it implicitly... They make three points in support of this argument: that the history of the Act reveals an intent...; that other provisions of the Act are expressly conditioned on a showing of prejudice; and that a literal interpretation produces illogical and absurd results. Neither separately nor in combination do these points justify a departure from the unambiguous statutory text."
as found in my affidavit by ignoring the clear language of the unambiguous statutory texts that do not allow registration against a legal vehicle definition and to display plates flat?
74. Does the Court find that Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment above. saying
"The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators. As the Court said in 1844: "The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself . . . ." Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 9, 24 "
got it wrong and legislative intent is whatever a judge thinks legislative intent must have been as opposed to applying the words actually used in a statute?
75. Does the Court realize that 29-A M.R.S.A. as revised in 1975 had no legislative debate recorded and thus the intent is only to be found within the words themselves or the 1975 traffic committee report which showed all traffic infractions were created to bypass criminal constitutional requirements which included the right to a free lawyer and trial by jury?
76. Did the Court decide that a thing similar is the same when it came to a public way by deciding a public road was almost the same as a public way and a public way is defined by characteristics that are not included or defined in 29-A. M.R.S.A. §101 (59) and (92) such as having signs and numbers?
77. Did the Court conflate ways and roads despite them being different in at least one element?
78. Did the Court pyramid assumptions upon assumptions instead of limiting one assumption to one proven fact as opposed to an opinion presented to determine facts that were not actually in evidence?
79. Where registration involves an excise tax and therefore is a taxing statute how did the Court ignore or apply the 2 Court decisions below by extending or not implications beyond the actual words used by ignoring an automobile must be in combination with a trailer or semi-trailer before it requires registration per 29-A M.R.S.A. §501 (1) and 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (15-A)?
United States v. Merriam, 263 US 179 - Supreme Court 1923; in statutes levying taxes the literal meaning of the words employed is most important, for such statutes are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. If the words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the Government and in favor of the taxpayer
Blaney v. Inhabitants of Town of Shapleigh, 455 A. 2d 1381 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1983
When a statute imposing or enforcing a tax or other burden on the citizen is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court will interpret the statute in a light most favorable to the citizen.
80, In a complete list I move the Court to give a complete list of the testimony or other evidence presented at trial directly as proven by the trial transcript or from introduced evidence that was filed with the Court and admitted at trial the Judge used to determine how each and every one of the 45 necessary elements was proven to exist at trial from the list shown below that allowed the Court to find me guilty
This list of elements is based on the 20 Statutes and 2 adjudicated definitions involved for the charge which includes an automobile found in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (7), (15-A), (42), (48), (50), (54), (55), (59), (61), (62), (66), (75), (86), (88), (90), (91), (92),,and §501 (1) paragraph 2 sentence 1 or the adjudicated definition of “vehicle“ as found in Burkitt, Inc. v. CHAMPION RD. MACHINERY. 29-A M.R.S.A. §351 (1) and 29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1) for improper display.
1 used for conveyance of passengers or property.
2 designed for passengers (not guests)
3 designed as a conveyance
4 a truck or truck tractor.
5 in combination with one or more trailers or semitrailers.
6 without motive power
7 designed primarily to carry property
8 used primarily to carry property or
8 designed exclusively to draw other vehicles
10 used exclusively to draw other vehicles but not constructed to carry a load.
11 used for (only) vehicular traffic.
12 an owner.
13.vehicle
14. operated or remains
15. public way
16. way
17. owned by the state, county, or municipality
18. public has a right to pass
19. prohibited or restricted by this title
20. owned by the state county or municipality
21. the public has the right to pass
22 conveyance of persons or property on a way
23 displayed horizontally (not vertically)
24 front and the rear
25 must always be horizontal.
26 visible and legible when horizontal from an unstated position but obviously higher than the plates
27violation of any provision of this Title, or of any rules established or stated under this Title
28 individual
29 drives or in control of a vehicle
30 holding title or having exclusive use
31 person as defined in 101 (54)
32 registration is required by title 29-A.
33 registration which includes registration of a vehicle
34 person
35 established residency in this State or has been domiciled in this State
36 Without motive power
37 Designed for being drawn by a motor vehicle;
38 designed so that some part of its weight and its load rests upon or is carried by that motor vehicle OR so constructed that no part of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle
39 operated or remains on a public way
40 not registered in accordance with this Title
41 fails to register a vehicle
42 not registered to remain on a public way
43 registration not displayed horizontally.
44 not properly displayed.
45 not visible and legible

81. How did the Court apply the following case considering the language used did not appear to include my use as required by registration statute and that horizontal could mean flat and that the view could have been required from aircraft in flight so that I relied on my rights to use the roads as the legislature forgot to regulate my machine?
Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs of Everglades Drainage Dist., 258 US 338 - Supreme Court 1922
“To say that the legislature simply was establishing the situation as both parties knew from the beginning it ought to be would be putting something of a gloss upon the facts. We must assume that the plaintiff went through the canal relying upon its legal rights and it is not to be deprived of them because the Legislature forgot”
82. Why did the Court decide to ignore the following Court case (found in affidavit) by adding judicial language to the statute which includes removing the requirement to have a trailer in combination to have a vehicle known as an automobile?
United States v. Goldenberg, 168 US 95 - Supreme Court 1897
“The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he has used. He is presumed to know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar.

No mere omission, no mere failure to provide for contingencies, which it may seem wise to have specifically provided for, justify any judicial addition to the language of the statute.
"No mere omission ... which it may seem wise to have specifically provided for, justif[ies] any judicial addition to the language of the statute""

83. Did the Court take notice when the state admitted under cross examination that the state did not prove multiple necessary elements.but instead the state had simply offered irrelevant “brute facts” without even proving standing did not appear to have been established as required by the perhaps fictitious plaintiff? See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555 - Supreme Court 1992

84. Why did the Court declare it was not interested in a lack of commencement of ratification which is necessary for a trial to proceed?

85. Upon what foundation did the Court refuse to answer my jurisdictional questions as the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that jurisdiction can be raised at any time?
Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn. of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 204 US 8 - Supreme Court 1907
"No judgment of a court is due process of law, if rendered without jurisdiction in the court, or without notice to the party." Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 46. No State can, by any tribunal or representative, render nugatory a provision of the supreme law.
US v. Weldon, Dist. Court, ED California 2010
"Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach merits, but, rather, should dismiss the action." Melo v. US, 505 F2d 1026. "The law provides that once State and Federal jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be proven." —Main v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980). "Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven." —Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533. "Where there is absence of jurisdiction, all administrative and judicial proceedings are a nullity and confer no right, offer no protection, and afford no justification, and may be rejected upon direct collateral attack." —Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157, 7 L.Ed. 381; Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cr. 9, 3 L. Ed. 471.
New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 US 411 - Supreme Court 1894; jurisdiction cannot be assumed
86. When I raised jurisdiction the plaintiff did not prove jurisdiction and the Court simply stated it had jurisdiction without using any evidence to prove how or why jurisdiction existed. Upon what foundation did the Court act to determine the Court could enact punishment after jurisdiction was challenged but before jurisdiction was proven as jurisdiction can not simply be declared to exist without evidence of the elements required to prove standing among other jurisdictional issues including evidence that the Constitution and statutes of Maine apply to me just because I am at a geographical location that the Court refused to hear?
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555 - Supreme Court 1992
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, see id., at 756; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740-741, n. 16 (1972);[1] and (b) "actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical,' " Whitmore, supra, at 155 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 102 (1983)). Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be "fairly. . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare 561*561 Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976). Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." Id., at 38, 43.
The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 231 (1990); Warth, supra, at 508. Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i. e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation
87. Did the Court ignore the holding in the Supreme Court case below by ignoring the word "and" in the statute requiring primary use to " and used primarily to carry property" ?
Idaho v. Wright, 497 US 805 - Supreme Court 1990; The word `and' is conjunctive. . . . The Legislature would have used the word `or' had it intended the disjunctive.
88. Did the Court construe title 29-A strictly as is required for a penal statute according to
State v. Chittim, 775 A. 2d 381 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2001
"The language of Title 29-A, sections 103 and 2104, provides that a violation of section 2104 constitutes a traffic infraction subjecting the violator to the imposition of a fine. Accordingly, the statute is penal, and we construe penal statutes strictly."?
89. Did the Court use a probability of the legislature having a certain intent not expressly stated within the statute in direct violation of United States v. Dotterweich, 320 US 277 - Supreme Court 1943; ""probability is not a guide which a court, in construing a penal statute, can safely take." United States v. Wiltberger, supra at 105." ?
90. Did the Court allow the state to constitute fraud in the Court by allowing an opinion to be considered valid in violation of
Transport Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 898 SW 2d 269 - Tex: Supreme Court 1995
An expression of opinion may constitute fraud when the speaker purports to have special knowledge.
Simply stated, opinion is actionable if a defendant makes use of artifice or trickery to prevent further investigation, and so deprives the plaintiff of other sources of information. See William L. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts § 109, p. 727 (4th ed. 1971). ?
91. Why did the Judge deny the objection I raised by allowing the word "vehicle" to be used multiple times by the state when its statutory definition found in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (91) as further refined in meaning by the Burkitt v. Champion road machinery case had been raised in objection and the word "vehicle" not been proven applicable?
92. Did the Court apply the legal definition found in Black's Law Dictionary 1280 (4th ed. 1968). PASSENGER. A person whom a common carrier has contracted to carry from one place to another" when determining if my grand marquis was designed for passengers and if it was used as a conveyance for passengers, and when it determined if my grand marquis was used to convey passengers?
93. Was it proven that the registration sticker could not have existed because no registration existed and the stickers could not have been purchased but were accidentally missing from the registration plates?
94.Without violating basic concepts of fairness why is a state allowed to create and pursue a cause of action and other legal charges when the state is ignorant of the statutes that are required to properly create and to bring forth that charge without knowing the statutes involved as is required to allow the state to determine if the statutes the state does not know were violated or if the statutes could be violated or not?
95. When the state did not know the number of statutes was that proof of incompetence and the inability of the state to properly apply the very statutes the state was ignorant of?
96. When the deputy did not know what the words "element" and “injury” mean how is that deputy competent to file or explain this legal charge?
97. Did the Court take notice when the state agreed the state did not know the law in its entirety which proves the state does not know the required statutes and the elements needed to prove whether or not this was a valid legal claim?
98. Did the Court take notice of the fact that the state did not know the elements required to file a proper charge against me?
99. Did the Court take notice of the fact that the state said the state had no evidence that my grand marquis was a specific vehicle type as found in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101?
100. . Did the Court take notice of the fact that the state did not recall the type of "vehicle" or "vehicle type" I had and the state claimed I had the legal vehicle type of a "car" although "car" is not a legal vehicle type found in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 or chapter 5?
101. . Did the Court take notice of the fact that the state did not know what an automobile is as defined in statute and the state had no idea how to prove what an automobile is?
102. Did the Court take notice of the fact that the state did not prove my grand marquis was used as a conveyance for passengers?
103. Did the Court add the word "passenger" to the status of operator as defined in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (48) Operator. "Operator" means an individual who drives or is in control of a vehicle or who is exercising control over or steering a towed vehicle. despite "passenger" not being included within that definition when the statutory definition includes "means" which necessarily excludes all possible unstated definitions?
104. Where on the trial transcript did the state prove my grand marquis requires registration according to this title presumably in title 29-A chapter 5?
105. How could the Court find me guilty when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided the evidence required to prove the legal requirement(s) of guilt?
106. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove that my grand marquis was used for conveyance of property?
107. .Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove that my grand marquis was a 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (15-A) combination vehicle?
108. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove that my grand marquis was a 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (88) truck?
109. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove that my grand marquis was a 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (90) truck tractor?
110. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove that my grand marquis was designed to carry property
111. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove my grand marquis was designed to carry property?
112. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove my grand marquis was used primarily to carry property?
113. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove my grand marquis was a truck tractor?
114. Did the Court take notice that a §29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (7) automobile that requires registration instantly and legally becomes a combination vehicle whenever registration might be required per 29-A M.R.S.A. §501 (1) "An automobile or sport utility vehicle used for the conveyance of passengers or property is a "combination" vehicle" ?
115. How did the Court apply the requirements found within 29-A M.R.S.A. §351 (6) Improper registration. "For purposes of this subsection, "not properly registered" means the vehicle is either registered in a manner that is not reflective of its current actual use or as a type of vehicle that it is not as a matter of law" while determining actual registration requirements?
116. How did the Court apply improper registrations relevance when determining whether or not registration could be legally obtained?
117. Why did the Court keep denying my questions or objections that were all regarding the elements required by statutory definitions to prove the charge?
118. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove my grand marquis was designed to draw other vehicles?
119.Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence that proved my grand marquis was designed not to carry a load?
120. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove my grand marquis was not proven to have a trailer or semi trailer attached?
121. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove a public way exists per 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (59) "Public way. "Public way" means a way, owned and maintained by the State, a county or a municipality, over which the general public has a right to pass." and (92)"Way. "Way" means the entire width between boundary lines of a road, highway, parkway, street or bridge used for vehicular traffic, whether public or private. "?
122. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove ownership of public way?
123. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove a public way actually exists in Maine?
124. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove a "way" was not used by non-vehicular traffic per 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (92) "Way. "Way" means the entire width between boundary lines of a road, highway, parkway, street or bridge used for vehicular traffic, whether public or private."?
125.Did the Court apply all required 20 statutes and 45 elements necessary when determining guilt?
126. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove my grand marquis was an automobile?
127. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove my grand marquis is legally a conveyance?
128.Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove my grand marquis conveys passengers?
129. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove my grand marquis conveys people?
130.Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove my grand marquis conveys property?
131. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove my grand marquis requires registration plates?
132. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove my grand marquis conveys people?
133. How could the Court find me guilty when the state in testimony did not provide evidence that proved my grand marquis had registration plates displayed in a position other than horizontally?
134. How could a display with the short end on top and the long end on the sides be vertical and horizontal as claimed by the state?
135. Did the Court take notice when the state did not prove my registration plate was not horizontal.
136. Whereas the Court told me I would be considered innocent if just one element was not proven how did the Court determine guilt when multiple elements required to be proven were agreed not to have been proven by the State?
137. Did the Court lie when he said if just one required element was not proven I would be considered innocent when instead he found me guilty?
138. Regardless of the Court being busy how could I have a fair trial when I was denied the ability to present what was perhaps half of my total and complete defense?
139. Was I asked if I understood the charges before the trial began?
140.Was I asked if I wanted to plead guilty or not guilty before the trial began?
141. How could I be tried without being asked if I was guilty or not?
142. How could I be tried without being asked if I understood the charges?
143. Why did District Judge Greg Campbell claim a traffic infraction is NOT a civil suit when State v. Anton which was provided to the Court in its entirety clearly stated "The legislation here in question does not provide merely that a fine be levied against a defendant found liable for a traffic infraction...We are aware of no civil suit in 1819 that would have been comparable to such a proceeding."?
144. Was District Judge Greg Campbell unaware that State v. Anton stated "We are aware of no civil suit in 1819 that would have been comparable to such a proceeding." despite that entire case being filed with the Court to inform the Court of that judicially determined fact?
145.How could the Court find me guilty when I was not allowed to ask the actual plaintiff any questions to determine if I injured them, what their injuries were, and why the plaintiff should be compensated for those injuries and why I had any duty to that plaintiff?
146. How could the Court find me guilty when the state in testimony never offered any proof of injury as is required for all civil suits?
147. Upon what legal foundation did the judge claim that lack of injury being proven was irrelevant in a civil suit?
148. The judge claimed an action was not a civil suit. What is the foundation for that claim?
149. How could the Court find me guilty when no certified affidavit of injury was presented by the claimant, the real party of interest?
150. How could the Court find me guilty when no evidence was provided showing who the real party of interest in the civil suit is?
151.How could the Court find me guilty when the state in testimony offered no proof that State of Maine exists and that existence requires the State of Maine to remain 100% within the corporate charter known as the Constitution that created the State of Maine which requires my Article 1 §16 and §20 rights to be upheld 100% but the Court I was in had denied me those rights that are recognized as unalienable and inherent by Maine’s Constitution?
152. Why and on what foundation did the judge say there is no need to have an injured party, injury, or evidence anyone so that I could challenge the basis of the claims unlike all other civil suits?
153. How could the Court find me guilty when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove the state had authority to stop me for a civil matter as opposed to a crime?
154. How can my speaking to an officer by using my freedom of speech right in a public area when I was inside my grand marquis be disorderly conduct as claimed by the State?
155. Does the Court agree that not providing anything per a deputies request which is not an order is not disorderly as a request is not legally an order and may be ignored?
156. What evidence not similarity as no similar thing is ever exactly alike was presented at trial that proved I used any sovereign citizen arguments or was a sovereign citizen as claimed by the state?
157. How Could the Court hold trial without the actual charging instrument (traffic ticket) that listed the vehicle type being available for my scrutiny at trial?
158. Upon what foundation did the Court determine the charging instrument was not defective despite it not listing the actual vehicle type required to be claimed as the specific vehicle type is necessary to allow a competent defense for the average litigant?
159. Did the Court accept as valid the testimony of the state that claimed "I was in a car" was her legally sufficient proof that my grand marquis is a "motor vehicle" when a car is not even defined in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 considering that viewing a thing is not evidence of the legal type and definition that must be proven to apply to that thing a motor vehicle?
160. How does being a mercury grand marquis without providing any further qualifications make it a motor vehicle as claimed by the state when the only proof offered was the use of that name?
161. As the state claimed my grand marquis was a vehicle because it was similar to other vehicles and nothing similar is every exactly the same how can my grand marquis being similar to other vehicles based on it having 4 wheels be relevant as claimed by the state as having 4 wheels is not to be found within the legal definitions?
162. How could the Court find me guilty when the state in testimony said that other machines similar to mine are vehicles is based on the states experience, education, and training which are not necessarily relevant when state omitted to include the actual legal basis for that distinction?
163. How could the Court find me guilty when having a "motor vehicle" is dependent upon a statutory definition to prove it is a "motor vehicle" as the claim made by the state that I had a "motor vehicle" was formed outside of any provable legal basis upon which to make that determination was the states testimony faulty or irrelevant?
164. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not proved the road was owned by the state as is required to be a public way?
165. As District Judge Greg Campbell told me I could not pay the fine with a debt instrument I move the Court to explain what am I supposed to find and use to pay the fine and where I may obtain that thing as federal reserve notes ARE debt instruments?
166. District Court judge Greg Campbell never told me what a dollar is or what a cent is. As gold was removed from the currency a dollar is no longer 1/10th of an eagle. As silver was removed from the currency a dollar is no longer a precise amount of a specific percentage of silver and alloy and a penny is no longer defined as copper. Therefore I move the Court to explain exactly what it is that has an actual inherent value that I may know precisely what a dollar refers to and means and what a cent refers to and means without referencing either a dollar or a cent in the reply so that I may obtain the proper things for the Court to pay the fine.
167. When I was told by the judge that all elements had to be proven or I would be considered innocent was that a truthful statement or a lie?
168. Was the inability of the state to recall that I had a grand marquis evidence that the state forgot about the actual machine in question until after an extended break during which the state could cheat by looking at something to give the state a memory?
169. Did the Court take notice when I denied I was a person after it was claimed by the prosecutor that I was a 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (54) "Person. "Person" means an individual, corporation, firm, partnership, joint venture, association, fiduciary, trust, estate or any other legal or commercial entity." is required for title 29-A to apply to me?
170.Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state never saw me move my registration plates?
171. Did the Court take notice when the state in testimony admitted the state had not provided evidence to prove my registration plates could move?
172. The judge agreed that 29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1) does not define front or back. Is no definition existing in Maine statute for front or back a disputed fact?
173 How is reading 29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (4) "Plainly visible and legible. Registration plates, including the numbers, letters and words, must always be plainly visible and legible." to mean plates must be viewed from overhead outside of the potential views required for registration plates displayed in a flat position unreasonable?
174. If the registration requirement was not proven to be required does the display of registration plates that are not proven to be needed thereby irrelevant?
175. Why does the Court apply a different legal standard of proof to traffic infraction civil suits compared to other types of civil suits by denying my innocence when the elements and statutes required to prove guilt were admitted by the state not to have been presented to the Court during cross examination?
176. When I was not allowed to present a total and complete defense because the judge stopped me from proceeding any further how was that not denying me a fair and impartial trial as I was not allowed to present a total and complete defense?
177. Did I know the difference between closing arguments and the first part of my testimony and all other aspects of Court procedure when I arrived in Court?
178. How and why was my not knowing those basic procedures evidence that I did understand Court procedures?
179. How could I have a fair trial if I was unable to differentiate between different parts of the trial to allow me to properly prepare for each part of trial before trial as the Court refused to give me clear and effective communications to allow me to understand each part of a trial prior to trial as requested?
180. How many times did I appear to be confused, lost, or frustrated by procedural requirements I did not understand at any point during the trial?
181. Did the Court take notice when I denied I was a person as defined in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (54) when no evidence was presented to prove I am a person?
182. Why and how does the road being given a name by the state have relevance in determining the correct ownership of a road?
183. Whereas I denied all necessary elements and all statutes involved when I presented a list of those elements that were not proven to be applicable by the state in what legal sense was my defense defective?
184. How could I be convicted when I denied it was possible or required to register my machines under current Maine law and those requirements were not proven to exist?
185. How was it determined that I had an “automobile” the specific element required that requires registration after I denied my grand marquis was designed for passengers and no proof was presented to prove that design element?
186. Did the Court take notice of the fact that I denied my grand marquis met any of the required statutory elements involved?
187. How was it proven that I am an owner after I denied I could be an owner as a true owner has complete control and would thus be impossible for my machine to be taxed?
Where was it proven that a prohibition on my grand marquis to use the streets existed as I denied any prohibition exists for my grand marquis to use a public way without registration per §102 "Any vehicle may be operated on a public way unless prohibited or restricted by this Title, by special law or municipal ordinance, or by rule of the department."?
188. Where was it proven that the view requirement of 29-A M.R.S.A. §452 (1) was not vague, void, and a nullity considering I said the view of plates requirement could be vague based on the unstated position for that view?
189. Why did the Court agree or disagree that 29-A M.R.S.A. §351 (1) "Failure to register A person who operates a vehicle that is not registered in accordance with this Title" is not a registration requirement by itself and a statute requiring registration must be proven to exist in chapter 5?
190. Does the Court agree that I detailed all of the required elements for the charges?
191. Could the officer have presented any information in Court to prove my grand marquis met design requirements without having a Ford Motor Company employee who was part of the design team that created my grand marquis to prove whether or not my grand marquis was designed for passengers or guests to avoid hearsay requirements?
192. Did the state have the required Ford Motor Company employee that was part of the original Grand Marquis design team testify that my grand marquis was designed for passengers to avoid a hearsay violation?
193. Was it proven that my grand marquis had a trailer hitch or trailer in combination as I denied I had a trailer hitch attached?
195. Did the Court recognize that I effectively denied the required elements were proven.
196. Did the Court recognize that I denied horizontal could mean anything other than flat.
197. Does the Court want me to disregard any law even when the law makes no sense to me such as when the law appears to require a registration plate be flat in its display?
198. As there is no requirement of where a plate must be viewed from what is incorrect about my assumption that it meant viewable by aircraft and cameras on the top of poles?
199. Were the statutes readily usable and their meaning accessible to me allowing me to benefit from reading and applying the statutes as required under the A.D.A. Title II?
200. Was evidence provided to disprove the only potential ways I could register my grand marquis was as an automobile or combination vehicle?
201. How could the statutes read as a whole NOT lead me to a definition that an automobile is a combination vehicle which requires an automobile to have a trailer attached?
202. Did the court accept that words referred to are to be treated as if incorporated?
203. Did the Court amend the statute to enlarge or restrict its meaning by applying the word “and” used in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (88) "Truck. "Truck" means a motor vehicle designed and used primarily to carry property. " to mean “or” against the Supreme Court ruling in . Idaho v. Wright, 497 US 805 - Supreme Court 1990; The word `and' is conjunctive. . . . The Legislature would have used the word `or' had it intended the disjunctive.?
204. Did the Court apply 29-A M.R.S.A. §501 (1) "An automobile or sport utility vehicle used for the conveyance of passengers or property is a "combination" vehicle" so it had its required effect?
205. What evidence was introduced that proved my grand marquis was designed for passengers?
206. What evidence was introduced that proved my grand marquis was NOT designed for guests?
207. What evidence was introduced to prove I was a common carrier as is legally required for me to carry passengers?
208. Was a contract ever presented that proved I carried passengers?
209. Did the Court accept that the U.S. Supreme Court said that merely being aboard is not enough to make anyone a passenger as shown in
LOZMAN v. CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA 11-626 U.S. supreme court 2013
“Transportation” involves the “conveyance (of things or persons) from one place to another.” And we must apply this definition in a “practical,” not a “theoretical,” way.
When it moved, it carried, not passengers or cargo, but at the very most (giving the benefit of any factual ambiguity to the City) only its own furnishings, its owner’s personal effects, and personnel present to assure the home’s safety. ?
210. Did the Court accept or deny each one of the legal definitions that I supplied directly from legal dictionaries? If the legal definitions were denied why were they denied?
211. Why did the Court NOT apply U.S. Supreme Court requirements shown in
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 US 156 - Supreme Court 1972; This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute, and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. [Citations omitted]
Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that "[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids."

by declaring the statute vague because it did not give me fair notice that my conduct was forbidden and instead found me guilty despite my cogent arguments that were based entirely on Maine Statutes and Court cases to find me innocent?

212. Why did the Court NOT apply Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 US 914 - Supreme Court 2000
When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning. Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 484-485 (1987) ("It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term"); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S., at 392-393, n. 10 ("As a rule, `a definition which declares what a term "means" . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated' "); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490, 502 (1945); Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 294 U. S. 87, 95-96 (1935) (Cardozo, J.); see also 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §47.07, p. 152, and n. 10 (5th ed. 1992) (collecting cases). That is to say, the statute, read "as a whole...leads the reader to a definition.

by applying definitions that were outside of the words included in Maine title 29-A §101?

213. When the Court had to tell me several times that I was not following the correct Court procedure and I asked directly how to correctly go forward why was that evidence or not that I did not understand Court procedures and rules of Court?
214. How is the answer, and the foundation upon that answer to #213 consistent with the pre-trial A.D.A. declaration that I am able to properly apply all Court rules when I had problems with the most basic trial concepts?
215. Is the legislature allowed to have a statute not apply to my grand marquis while requiring other machines to register based solely on the use of my machine as stated in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144 - Supreme Court 1938 The Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause, and even that of the Fourteenth, applicable only to the states, does not compel their legislatures to prohibit all like evils, or none. A legislature may hit at an abuse which it has found, even though it has failed to strike at another. ?
216. When the State of Maine modifies an unalienable right including Me. Const. Art. 1 §20 that was voted upon in 1819 or subsequent amendments as strict conditions applied by the people of Maine in their acceptance of Maine’s creation which included Maine's Constitution by the people of Maine how does that not violate the expressed will of the people that created the State of Maine by a vote in 1819 as the State of Maine was created and allowed to exist solely on the basis that the unalienable rights mentioned would remain 100% intact as the foundation upon which the State of Maine was formed?
217. When that contractual foundation the state was built upon known as the State of Maine Constitution which was designed to force the State of Maine to recognize perfectly without exception or limitation the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights that are found in Me. Const. Art. 1 as those pre-existing rights belong to the people of Maine is violated in any way how can the government created by that enforceable contract known as the Constitution continue to exist considering that Ex nudo pacto non oritur action. No actions arises on a naked contract without a consideration.;Ex turpi contractu non oritur actio. No action arises on an immoral contract; Le contrat fait la loi. The contract makes the law.; Debile fundamentum, fallit opus. Where there is a weak foundation, the work falls; Sublato fundamento cadit opus. Remove the foundation, the structure or work fall.; When the foundation fails, all fails?
218. Where is the Constitution did the people ever expressly grant the state an interest that allows unalienable rights to be violated or modified in any way which would violate the unalienable intention the people required as compensation to allow the State of Maine to be created?
219. I move the Court to explain exactly what “unalienable” means and how unalienable can ever be made less than 100% intact and still remain unalienable rights as they would then be alienable.
220. Where did the people of Maine who voted to accept the State of Maine’s governance expressly grant constitutional authority to allow unalienable rights as a the required compensation for being governed by the State of Maine to be modified in any manner?
221. How can a right that is unalienable be modified in any way without having that modification be absolute evidence that the unalienable right is absolutely not actually treated as being unalienable by the State of Maine and therefore the Constitution of Maine has been violated and the State of Maine has therefore based on a violation of its corporate charter ceased to exist because the vote taken to create the state in 1819 was based on that required compensation of unalienable rights that allowed the State of Maine to govern was removed and thereby ended all contractual obligations and authorities of all parties involved?
222. The Court declared I had a vehicle during sentencing. What specific type of vehicle was my grand marquis determined to be and what evidence presented during trial was depended upon to prove my grand marquis was a specific vehicle type mentioned in §101 and required by chapter 5 to have registration that proved a registration requirement exists?
223. Whereas the Court has declared that I have a vehicle that needs registration I move the Court to show the proven registration requirement which requires the production of evidence directly from the trial that shows me how to obtain a proper legal registration that does not require registering by violating the requirements within a 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 definition.
224. Can the registration requirement for a “vehicle” exist without also having a provable specific 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 vehicle type also found in 29-A M.R.S.A. chapter 5?
225. What exact testimony proved I had a specific vehicle type that required registration as the state admitted state did not prove the elements required to have a "vehicle" or "automobile" as defined in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (91) and the Burkitt case?
226. How was a specific vehicle type proven to apply to my grand marquis at trial?
227. Do any vehicle types perhaps including but not limited to a big wheel, wagon, buggy, bicycle, or roller skates exist that are allowed to use the streets without any registration? :lol:
228. I had my defense laid out point by point piece by piece on paper. My prepared defense was to be presented in a very specific order going through one part completely before proceeding to the next part. Why in violation of State v. Buchanan did the Court stop me from providing a complete and total defense which included multiple defenses including a 1st amendment defense, showing the state may have committed perjury at trial by the use of video, and the lack of commencement of ratification, among other issues all of which I was denied the ability to ever introduce along with multiple jurisdictional issues that I was prepared to raise at the end of my multiple defenses?
State v. Buchanan, 921 A. 2d 159 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2007
"[A] defendant is accorded wide latitude to present all evidence relevant to his defense." State v. Garrett, 1998 ME 7, ¶ 5, 704 A.2d 393, 395 (quotation marks omitted). See also McMahan, 2000 ME 200, ¶ 18, 761 A.2d at 55.
State v. Dean, 589 A. 2d 929 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1991
a defendant is accorded wide latitude to present all evidence relevant to his defense. State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167, 172 (Me.1984); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me.1981); State v. Leclair, 425 A.2d 182, 186 (Me.1981).
229. What knowledge did the Court possess that allowed the Court to know what exactly each of the unstated legal theories and foundations that all of my unpresented defenses would have included?
230. When the Court denied my access to law enforcement dash cam video and the charging instruments how did that lack of ability to know the particulars involved not limit my ability to present a defense?
231. Why did this Court deny my requests for discovery which were allowed to be presented as a Brady motion which is recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court?
Strickler v. Greene, 527 US 263 - Supreme Court 1999
In Brady, this Court held "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U. S., at 87. We have since held that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused, United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 107 (1976), and that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence,
232. When the state admitted state had not proven my grand marquis was used as a conveyance for passengers or property which is how a "vehicle" is defined what evidence presented at trial did the Court use as a foundation to determine that I had a "vehicle" as defined in 29-A M.R.S.A. §101 (91) and the Burkitt case?
233. Did the Court apply the statutes literally as I must based on my learning disabilities?
234. As this suit was all about a controversy about my property specifically my 2005 grand marquis what evidence and reasoning was used to deny my Me. Const. Art. 1 § 20 right to trial by jury for a CONTROVERSY CONCERNING PROPERTY as my grand marquis is my property and there was a controversy over whether or not it required registration, was a vehicle, if property known as registration plates were in a proper display, and if I was an owner or the State of Maine had exercised control over my grand marquis and who owns the streets?
235. Did the Judge despite taking an oath declaring that "I will support the Constitution of the United States and of this State" feel free to commit acts of sedition against the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Maine by denying my federal equal protection and due process rights at trial by applying varying standards to Me. Const. Art. 1 §20 and by denying my right to a total and complete defense and multiple defenses by stopping me from presenting more of my prepared defense?
236. Did I receive a trial that properly applied Williams v. United States, 341 US 97 - Supreme Court 1951 "It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court"?
29 pages were required to hold the fofcol shown above. The question below made it to page 30.
237. I move the Court to amend its findings of no right to trial by jury and also to amend its findings of guilt based on the inability of the Court to prove that all of the required elements were proven at trial as truthful answers given in reply to this fofcol will show.
There is a reason that LEO has a new meaning: Legally Entitled to Oppress. Thanks to Bob Livingston for this one.

Williams v. United States, 341 US 97 - Supreme Court 1951
It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court.

Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 US 54 - Supreme Court 1795
Judges may die, and courts be at an end; but justice still lives, and, though she may sleep for a while, will eventually awake, and must be satisfied
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Re: My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Postby Nunya_Bizness » Wed May 31, 2017 11:53 pm

Albert Einstein once said "The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results".
Think about this quote for a second and ask yourself, does this quote apply to the way you are dealing with this court case?
Apistevist
noun
- a person (not a legal person)who does not use faith to know things, especially in the religious sense
The burden of proof lies(Prevarication) on religion.
Theism:
"The belief that logic and the brain deducing the logic is not flawed to the point that one can come to the conclusion/belief that god(s) exists." -Nunya_Biziness
Definition of God = The total sum of human ignorance.
If you propose the existence of something, you must follow the scientific method in your defense of it’s existence, otherwise, I have no reason to listen to you.
*Faith* The excuse people give for believing something without good reason.>> *Faith, The grownup word for pretend.
Not a person
http://bindingthefirm.myfastforum.org/d ... b3c912fb94

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Re: My Grand Marquis is not legally an automobile in Maine.

Postby lostandfound » Thu Jun 01, 2017 9:45 am

country-hick, you need to prosecute real crimes. :angel:
"None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free. The truth has been kept from the depth of their minds by masters who rule them with lies. They feed them on falsehoods till wrongs look like right in their eyes." ~ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

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